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John W. Wade*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of frivolous civil litigation has plagued the common law since the court system became mature and, indeed, prior to
that time. Frivolous lawsuits cause appreciable harm to many persons, and in many ways. The person against whom the groundless
suit is brought is subjected to serious harassment and inconvenience,
pecuniary loss through necessary attorney's fees, deprival of time
from his business or profession, and, in some cases, harm to reputation and even physical damage to person or property. The court system itself becomes more clogged, disrupted, and delayed, thus affecting the taxpayers in general, and other litigants who have their suits
delayed. The situation cries out for remedies to avert these harms.
On the other hand, the courts were established for the purpose
of providing a peaceful means for settling disputes and reaching just
results on the basis of established legal principles. One who believes
that he has been aggrieved should be entitled to approach the courts
for relief without having to guarantee that he is correct. The courts
* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus, Vanderbilt University; Reporter,
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Vols. 3 and 4. B.A., 1932, J.D., 1934, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1935, S.J.D., 1942, Harvard University.
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have always regarded themselves as open to the public for the purpose of letting parties learn whether a disputed claim is valid; and
they have jealously preserved and guarded this significant function. 1
Obviously, a fine line must be drawn, delicately balancing important conflicting interests, in order to decide whether the bringing
of a cause of action is justifiable or not.' To do this, the common law
developed a special tort action, specifically designed to take care of
this problem. This tort-although there is no consensus on the name
to be given to it-has a number of elements, or requirements, directed primarily to the task of establishing a standard for determining whether the bringing of the original action was wrongful (tortious). Because of their jealous protection of the position that they
should always be open for the public to use, the courts have frequently declared that they do not favor the action. 3 The scope of the
requirements has varied in England and the United States, and even
within the states themselves. All of this has made the use of the tort

action rather spotted and its effectiveness quite doubtful. Efforts
have been made to adapt other tort actions to this situation, with the
hope that they might prove more effective, but they have not met
1. Indeed, most state constitutions have provisions commanding open access to the
courts. They are collected, with citations, and quoted in Johnson & Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them-What Relief is Available?, 36 ALA. L. REv. 927,
928 n.8 (1985).
2. This idea is frequently expressed by judges and law review writers. From the many
examples that might have been chosen, I have selected one to quote. It is taken from an opinion of Judge Henry Edgerton, written over forty years ago:
The law tries to avoid both too much discouragement and too much encouragement of litigation. Some sort of balance has to be struck between the social interests
in preventing unconscionable suits and in permitting honest assertion of supposed
rights. These interests conflict because a suit which its author thinks honest may
look unconscionable to a jury.
Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1945). He resolved this case because the person
bringing the original action had brought several of them in succession.
We see no good reason why the law should tolerate repeated abuse of its
processes. To allow redress for such abuse will not seriously hamper the honest assertion of supposed rights. No one is likely to be deterred from litigating an honest
claim by fear that some future jury may erroneously decide that he has brought two
suits maliciously and without probable cause.
Id. We do not often have the luxury of successive suits to make the decision easier. The task is
to protect the harassed defendant by affording him appropriate relief, but to accompany it
with sufficient limitations and restrictions to avoid injury to the honest plaintiff.
3. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828 (1979); Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Young v. First State
Bank, 628 P.2d 707 (Okla. 1981).
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with much success.
Other devices, largely procedural, have been employed, with
more indications of success. Thus, some damages may be included in
the allocation of costs of an action, either by statute or under the
inherent powers of the court. Contemporary rules of civil procedure
often grant the trial court authority to impose a sanction for misuse
of procedural rights, powers, or privileges, including the bringing of
a suit itself. This sanction, or punishment, may include an award of
attorney's fees to the other party.
The whole problem of frivolous litigation necessarily exists in
any country that establishes a court system to settle civil disputes
among its citizens. The civil law countries have developed a broad
tort concept of abuse of rights, covering many types of situations,
and they apply it to the right of bringing a lawsuit." The results are
similar to those under the common law. Even though there is no

such broad principle, or tort action, in this country, we have numerous individual applications of the same idea.
In recent years, the whole problem has been substantially exacerbated, due perhaps to the continued increase in population, to the
so-called litigation explosion, 5 to the substantial increase in very
complex cases involving multiple parties, 6 to the influence of inflation
4. See Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22 (1933). See generally R.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 695-719 (4th ed. 1980), and

authorities reprinted and cited therein.
5. See, e.g., J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); Barton, Behind the Legal
Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III
Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976); Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 767
(1977); Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate?, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1349 (1972). But cf. Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (growth
of litigation consistent with previous growth rates, not a dramatic acceleration of historic
trends); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (report on a study of randomly sampled civil cases throughout the
United States, concluding that the present system provides sufficient incentives to settle or
avoid litigation).
In 1986 the issue has flared up again, in exaggerated form. See Sorry, Your Policy is
Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16-26; Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working
Group on the Causes, Extent, and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance
Availability and Affordability (Feb. 1986); Nat'l Center for State Courts, A Preliminary Examination of Available Civil and Criminal Trend Data in State Trial Courts for 1978, 1981
and 1984 (April 1986).
6. Currently, both the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have committees seeking solutions to the difficult problem
of highly complex cases.
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on damage verdicts, and to the steadily broadening application of the
law of torts.7 Added to this is a growing tendency on the part of both
parties to a civil action to utilize procedural rights and other opportunities to stretch out the time taken for trial of a case and to make
the trial as expensive as possible for the other party, primarily for
the purpose of harassing him, inducing a favorable outcome or settlement of the case, or making him think twice before engaging in another, similar case. All of this has had the effect of adding greatly to
the court clog and the exasperation of the courts and the public. It
has also produced calls for increased action to curtail frivolous suits
and could perhaps result in hasty and unwise action.
The past several years have brought concerted efforts on the
part of two professions to discourage tort actions against their members. These are the medical profession (malpractice actions)8 and the
news media (defamation actions). 9 A survey of many of the reported
cases creates the impression that the courts began to recognize this
and to react adversely. Without expressly saying so, these courts apparently concluded that the retaliatory suits were often brought for
the purpose of discouraging malpractice and defamation suits in general, not just those that are frivolous. Some appellate opinions have
become almost sophistic in responding adversely to suits in tort for
bringing a frivolous action. The medical attack has now become
counterproductive and is waning, although restrictive legislation has
been enacted in many states.10 The media attack has not reached the
appellate courts in sufficient numbers to warrant a conclusion as to
its effect. It may possibly be that the first amendment can prove a
talisman here.
All of this suggests that a study of frivolous actions (in the
7. See J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 5, at ch. 2.
8. There are many law review articles and student notes on this subject. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack. Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical
MalpracticeActions, 45 FORDHAM L. RaV. 1003 (1977); Greenbaum, Physician Countersuits:
A Cause Without Action, 12 PAc. L.J. 745 (1981). See also articles cited infra note 12. The
reported cases are very numerous. Representative cases will be cited throughout this Article.
9. See, e.g., Brannigan & Ensor, Did Bose Speak Too Softly?: Product Critiques and
the First Amendment, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.571 (1986); Meiklejohn, Public Speech and Libel
Litigation: Are They Compatible?, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 547 (1986).
A third group that may possibly undertake a concerted attack on frivolous action against
its members is municipal corporations and other governmental agencies and officials, since they
are now undergoing an "insurance crisis." See, e.g., Hays, Delaware CrackingDown on "Frivolous Suits," Nat'l L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
10. See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: ConstitutionalAttacks on Medical
Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1985).
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broad sense of that term)" and the various efforts to exert reasona-

ble controls over them may prove helpful. The purposes of the law of
torts are to provide compensation for harm, to declare and vindicate
rights, to deter wrongful conduct, and to punish it when appropriate.
To do this, tort law should establish a clear standard for determining
when the conduct is wrongful, thus making relief available without
undue difficulty.

This Article represents an attempt to undertake a study, first of
the tort actions and then of the procedural controls, to describe and

analyze the solutions and techniques that have been developed, and
to offer a view of a fair, balanced, and comprehensive solution, based
on a synthesis of the ideas expressed in cases and legislation.
II.
A.

THE TORT ACTIONS

Malicious Civil Prosecution

2

The tort action developed by the common law to provide a remedy for the bringing of a baseless or unjustifiable civil action is unlike most torts in that it has not acquired a name commonly used to
identify it. It developed after the tort of malicious prosecution had
11. "Frivolous litigation" applies primarily to the bringing of a lawsuit that has no
merit. But the expression is broad enough to include the use of elements and techniques of
litigation that are unjustifiable under the circumstances, whether resorted to by plaintiff or
defendant.
12. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674-681B (1977); W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (5th ed. 1984); M. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS §§ 23-36 (1892); R. MALLEN
& V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 45-60 (2d ed. 1981).
See Birnbaum, supra note 8; Greenbaum, supra note 8; Jacobs & Gage, Malicious Prosecution-A Response to "Assault With a Deadly Lawsuit: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy,"
52 L.A. BAR J. 10 (1977) (responding to Wills, infra); Lawson, The Action for Malicious
Prosecution of a Civil Suit, 21 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 281 & 353 (1882); Reuter, Physician
Countersuits: A Catch-22, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 203 (1980); Thode, The Groundless Case-The
Lawyer's Tort Duty to His Client and to the Adverse Party, 11 ST. MARY'S LJ. 59 (1979);
Wills, Assault With a Deadly Lawsuit: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 51 L.A. BAR J. 499
(1976); Note, Attorneys' Li ability to Clients' Adversariesfor InstitutingFrivolous Lawsuits:
A Reassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 775 (1979); Note, Malicious Prosecution
and Medical Malpractice Legislation in Indiana: A Questfor Balance, 17 VAL U.L. REV. 877
(1983) [herinafter Note, Malicious Prosecution]; Note, Liability for Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1980); Note, Countersuit:A Viable Alternativefor
the Wrongfully Sued Physician?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 450 (1980); Note, A Lawyer's Duty to
Reject Groundless Litigation; 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980); Note, Groundless Litigation
and the Malicious ProsecutionDebate: A HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE LJ. 1218 (1979) [herinafter Note, Groundless Litigation]; Comment, Malicious Prosecution: Truly a Viable Action on the Part of One Falsely Accused of Medical Malpractice?, 15 AKRON L. REv. 556
(1982); Comment, Countersuits to Legal and Medical Malpractice Actions: Any Chance for
Success?, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 93 (1981).
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been established and had acquired certain attributes. Malicious prosecution was the name given to the tort of bringing or instigating a
baseless criminal prosecution against another. Many courts lumped
the two torts together, and applied the same name to a groundless
civil action as well as to an unwarranted criminal prosecution.
Others spoke of malicious prosecution for a civil action. The Restatement of Torts uses the expression "wrongful use of civil proceedings.' 3 "Frivolous litigation" is a broadly inclusive title using the
adjective "frivolous" in a strictly legal sense, meaning litigation that
is groundless, unwarranted, or palpably lacking in merit. For the tort
action itself, I adopt here the appellation "malicious civil
prosecution."
The courts have placed stringent restrictions upon this tort action. 4 In some states, the restrictions are so stringent as to render
the cause of action essentially unavailable.15 There is general agreement, however, that these restrictions can be reduced to five specific
requirements, on all of which the plaintiff in the suit for malicious
civil prosecution (the present plaintiff)16 has the burden of proof.
They are: (1) the present defendant must have taken an active part
in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of the original civil
proceeding; (2) the original proceeding must have terminated in
favor of the present plaintiff; (3) there must be damage of the type
that the court regards as appropriate for an action of this nature; (4)
there must be a lack of probable cause for the original action; and
(5) there must have been "malice" in the bringing of the original
action. More detailed treatment is needed for each of these
requirements.
1. Commencement of the OriginalAction.- One "commences"
an action when he takes an active part in initiating, continuing, or
procuring it.'1 This includes not only the person who is named as the
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674-68 1B (1977).
14. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 120; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 674-681B (1977).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 reporter's note (1977).

16. It is very easy to confuse the parties in an action for malicious civil prosecution, as
they always change titles in the two actions. Note that the original plaintiff (plaintiff in the
first suit) becomes the present defendant (defendant in the retaliatory suit) and vice versa. In
identifying a party, I regularly use the adjectives original or present to make clear which
person I have in mind.
17.

In Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884), the issuance of a

summons alone was held to be a commencement. Note that even if the original plaintiff (or his
attorney) reasonably believes he has a valid suit when the complaint is filed, the requirement
may be met if he later finds he is in error and still continues with the suit.
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plaintiff, but also his attorney and any other person who plays an
active role in promoting or producing the commencement of the suit.

A counterclaim counts as a suit in this regard."8
2. Favorable Termination.-A final ruling for the present plaintiff, whether by motion to dismiss, summary judgment, or jury verdict, suffices as a favorable termination. 9 A settlement does not. 0
Dismissal without prejudice may require additional evidence. 2 The
requirement of favorable termination has meant that it is generally
held not to be possible for a defendant to file a counterclaim for
malicious civil prosecution to the original complaint, even though he
conceives that the suit against him was frivolous.22
18. The counterclaim here involves a claim that the original defendant asserts against
the original plaintiff in the same action. For that purpose he is acting as plaintiff, and the
counterclaim may be frivolous. This does not apply, however, to a counterclaim for malicious
civil prosecution on the ground that the initial action was baseless.
19. If the defendant wins the original suit on the basis of the statute of limitations and
there is no indication that plaintiff was aware of the running, however, it has been held that
this is a technical or procedural, as distinguished from a substantive, termination, and will not,
therefore, qualify as a favorable termination. Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 751-52, 602
P.2d 393, 395-96, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695-96 (1979).
20. See Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 184-85, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745,
755 (1979). A "settlement" connotes a compromise, with each party receiving something. But
cf. Young v. First State Bank, 628 P.2d 707, 710 (Okla. 1981) (settlement on payment by one
original defendant does not prevent action by another defendant if the other defendant
"neither procured, consented to nor participated in the settlement upon which the original
action was dismissed"). See also Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (consenting to a summary judgment without inducement from the other side would
indicate that a settlement had not occurred).
21. Even a dismissal with prejudice may be found not to be a "favorable termination."
See, e.g., Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979), where
suit was brought but necessarily dropped when original defendants sought to make the expense
of suit so great that it would exceed the amount of damages incurred by the original plaintiff.
Perhaps this could be better explained on the ground that there was no lack of probable cause.
See also Moses v. Hoebel, 646 P.2d 601 (Okla. 1982), where a plaintiff brought suit,
dismissed it, and then later brought it again. The trial judge in the second suit issued a writ
forbidding the plaintiff from maintaining that suit until he had paid the legal expenses in the
first suit. The supreme court held that the trial judge's action was unconstitutional. Id. at 605.
22. See Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845-46, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 179, 181 (1971) (lower court would not allow a declaratory judgment in the original suit
on grounds that the suit was unjustified). See also Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 598, 36
N.W. 664, 668 (1888) and Embassy Sewing Stores, Inc. v. Leumi Fin. Corp., 39 A.D.2d 940,
941, 333 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1972) (action for malicious prosecution cannot be instituted until
present plaintiff has been granted a favorable termination in original suit). Some courts have
allowed counterclaims, however. See, e.g., Sonnichsen v. Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 659, 239
A.2d 63 (1967); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d 246 (1951),
aff d, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952). A counterclaim against the plaintiff in the original suit
and a third-party cross-claim against the latter's attorney were apparently allowed in Martin
v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), but no one recovered.
See also Note, Counterclaimfor Malicious Prosecutionin the Action Alleged to be Ma-
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3. Damage.-A person contemplating the requirement of damages without a study of its historical background would probably assume that meeting this element of the case should involve no difficulty because anyone who has to defend against an unjustifiable
action is certain to have incurred attorney's fees and other normal
expenses of litigation, such as the loss of time from his business. This
is pecuniary loss, easily proved. But there is a completely different
rule in England from that in a majority of the American states; and
a sharp distinction has also developed within the American states
themselves, with a substantial minority of them following what is
often called the "English rule." 23 This distinction derives from the
historical development of the cause of action.
Originally, many centuries ago, the common law remedy for
bringing a groundless action was amercement, a kind of fine, of variable amount, the precise sum in the particular case to be set by "affeerors" and normally to be measured by reasonable attorney's fees
incurred by the defendant. The fine went not to the defendant, but to
the court; and the remedy was thus in the form of a sanction serving
solely as a deterrent, rather than as compensation to the injured defendant. The writ of conspiracy came into use as providing relief to
the injured party, but its application was very limited. Eventually,
after the enactment of the Statute of Westminster II in 1285, permitting actions in consimili casu, and the origin of trespass on the
24
case, an action in case for malicious prosecution began to develop.
liclous, 58

YALE

L. 490 (1949) and Note, Groundless Litigation,supra note 12 (both urging

that the counterclaim be made compulsory).
23. The English rule requires a showing that the underlying suit has caused special damages. See O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 517, 569 P.2d 561, 563 (1977). Special damages

are a form of damages beyond those generally resulting from similar litigation. Special damages include interference with the person, see, e.g., Woodley v. Coker, 119 Ga. 226, 228, 46
S.E. 89, 90 (1903) (arrest under civil process), as well as proceedings that interfere with property, see, e.g., Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d 246 (1951), affid,
9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (injunction preventing company from conducting normal busi-

ness constitutes a "special grievance").
24.

The leading English case was Savile v. Roberts, I Ld. Raym. 374, 91 Eng. Rep.

1147 (K.B. 1698), also the subject of nine other reports. Holt, C.J. is quoted in the report cited
above as saying that
there are three sorts of damages, any of which would be sufficient ground to support

this action. I. The damage to a man's fame, as if the matter whereof he is accused
be scandalous. . . . 2. The second sort of damages . . . are such as are done to the
person; as where a man is put in danger to lose his life, or limb, or liberty. . . . 3.
The third . . . is damage to a man's property, as where he is forced to expend his
money . . . to acquit himself of the crime of which he is accused. . . . [But this

was a criminal prosecution, and] there is a great difference between the suing of an
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Beginning in 1275 with the Statute of Gloucester, a series of
statutes, together with relevant judicial interpretations, had the com-

bined effect of providing that costs would regularly be imposed upon
the losing party in a lawsuit in favor of the winning party.2 5 More
important, if the original suit was a civil action, "costs" to the winner came to include attorney's fees (covering both solicitor's fees and
money paid to counsel) and other normal litigation expenses.21 As a
result, they were not elements of damage that could be recovered in
the subsequent tort action as "extra costs." '2 7 Other types of damage

were required for the action to lie.
In the United States, on the other hand, the concept of "costs"
has developed in a quite different fashion. There is no regular practice of awarding attorney's fees or other litigation expenses to the
winning party. 8 Instead, each party to a lawsuit pays his own litigation expenses, and costs cover designated amounts for court expenses, rather than the litigation expenses of a party. These costs are
action maliciously, and the indicting of a man maliciously.
Id. at 378-79, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1149-50. See also Waterer v. Freeman, Hob. 266, 80 Eng. Rep.
412 (K.B. 1617); cf.Temple v. Killingworth, 12 Mod. 4, 88 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1692) (one
may sue another for a suit brought without a cause of action if original suit was brought with
malice and vexatious design).
The historical development of the tort of malicious civil prosecution is treated in full detail in Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 12. See also M. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS ch.l, §§ 23-25 (1892); P. WINFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921); P. WINFIELD.
THE PRESENT LAW OF ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921); Lawson, The Action for the

Malicious Prosecution of a Civil Suit (pts. 1 & 2), 21 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 281, 353 (1882). I
have referred to the historical development only insofar as it affects the point in issue here.
25. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852-53 (1929).
26. Id. at 856-59. See C. MCCORMICK. DAMAGES § 60 (1935).
27. See Quartz Hill Consol. Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q.B.D. 674, 682-83 (C.A.
1883) (Brett, M.R.); see also id. at 690 (Bowen, L.J.). The original suit was a petition under
the Company's Act to wind up a company. This was regarded as affecting the company's "fair
fame and credit," and the tort action for malicious civil prosecution would lie. Injury to "fair
fame" was a consequential injury, not a litigation expense.
See also the more contemporary case of Berry v. British Transp. Comm'n, 1 Q.B. 306
(C.A. 1961), where a criminal prosecution against the present plaintiff, an offense subject only
to a fine, was quashed on appeal, and she was awarded 15 guineas as costs for attorney's fees.
These fees were inadequate, and the plaintiff brought this action of malicious prosecution for
adequate attorney's fees. The court of appeals held that she might raise the issue, differentiating this problem from one in which the original suit was a civil action. There the authorities
were found to hold that she could not raise the issue that the award of attorney's fees was
inadequate. The three Lord Justices had considerable trouble in explaining the basis of the
rule, and Devlin, L.J., criticized it sharply. Id. at 319-25. For a further discussion of this case,
see Note, The Perils of Pulling a Communication Cord, 25 MOD. L. REV. 89 (1962).
28. See I S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES §§ 12:3-12:6 (1973).
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paid to the court and do not inure to the benefit of the other party.
As a result of this historical difference, a majority of the American
states have held that attorney's fees and other litigation expenses are
an appropriate element of damages in the tort action for malicious
civil prosecution. Since there are almost always some litigation expenses incurred by the defendant in a wrongful civil action brought
against him, there is no difficulty in meeting the damage requirement in the present action; and this requirement plays no significant
part in determining whether liability should be imposed. Of course,
other damage elements may add to the amount of the judgment, if
properly proved.
A substantial minority of the American states, however, have
declined to accept this position; declaring that they are following the
English rule, they hold that the present plaintiff cannot prevail in his
suit if his only proof of damages is of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses in the original action. For the suit to succeed, they
declare, he must prove special damages.3 0
This position may quite properly be called perverse. It means
that even if all of the other requirements of the action for malicious
civil prosecution are fully met, the plaintiff in the present suit cannot
prevail if the only damage shown is that which is necessarily involved in the wrongful conduct of the original plaintiff in bringing
the frivolous action, and recovery is allowed only if he can prove
special damage rather than that which normally occurs. In some instances, the position may be explained by the fact that the court
thought it was following the classic English common law rule and
did not advert to the vital difference of the English and American
practices regarding the nature of costs. Other cases, however, make
29. See, e.g., Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Eastin
v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884); Whipple v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 581 (1836);
Ahring v. White, 156 Kan. 60, 131 P.2d 699 (1942); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558
(1897); Ryerson v. American Sur. Co., 213 Tenn. 182, 373 S.W.2d 436 (1963); Closson v.
Staples, 42 Vt. 209 (1869); Hunter v. Beckley Newspaper Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 40 S.E.2d

332 (1946).
30. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 641 (D.C. 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 III. App. 3d 940, 945-47, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371-72 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
828 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 41-48, 312 N.W.2d 585, 600-03 (1981); Potts
v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382 (1816); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 516-19, 569 P.2d 561, 56365 (1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Ayyildiz v. Kidd,
220 Va. 1080, 1083-85, 266 S.E.2d 108, 111-12 (1980).

The majority and minority states are classified in several places. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 674 reporter's note (appendix vol. 1981); see also O'Toole v. Franklin, 279
Or. 513, 518 nn. 3 & 4, 569 P.2d 561, 564 nn. 3 & 4 (1977); Note, Malicious Prosecution,

supra note 12, at nn. 86 & 88.
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clear that the court was fully aware of what it was doing. They offer

rationalizations that are unconvincing. Perhaps the most frequent argument is that the courts should always be open and available for
the settlement of disputes, and litigants should not be chilled from
resorting to courts because of the fear of being subjected to legal
liability for bringing the action."1 Despite the force in the argument
that an action for wrongful civil proceedings should be carefully restricted to keep its availability from discouraging meritorious suits,
however, it should be apparent that the special injury restriction is
not truly relevant to that purpose. It has nothing to do with whether

the original action was meritorious or not. It cuts down drastically
on the number of suits for malicious civil prosecution that can be
maintained, but not on the basis that the original action was ground-

less. It bars the action for malicious civil prosecution regardless of
whether the initial action was quite meritorious or completely frivolous, and without even giving consideration to that issue. The position cannot be justified on the basis of either logic or social policy.
Under the minority American rule, a plaintiff can recover if the
original suit involved an interference with his person or property, and
perhaps also with a proceeding charging insanity or insolvency, or
with repeated civil actions for harassment of the other party.32
31. There are dissenting opinions on the issue of the English rule in many of the cases,
but the best presentation of the conflicting arguments is found in the several opinions in Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). For a similar debate at an earlier time,
see Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382 (1816). In Stopka v. Lesser, 82 I11.App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d
781 (1980), an intermediate court urged a "reassessment" of the special damage requirement.
In Pennsylvania, a statute changed from the English to the majority American rule. See
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8351 (Purdon 1982); Blumenfeld v. R. M. Shoemaker Co., 286 Pa.
Super. 540, 545, 429 A.2d 654, 656-57 (1981). On the appropriateness of judicial change, see
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 520-22, 569 P.2d 561, 565-66 (1977).
It is also generally held under the minority rule that special damages will not apply to
harm to professional reputation, the incurring of mental distress and embarrassment, or the
loss of liability insurance or increase of insurance premiums. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il1.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979). This is inconsistent
even with the English rule, which the minority purport to follow. Costs under the English rule
include attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation. These damages are not expenses of the
litigation process but are consequential-arising as a result of the litigation and the appropriate basis for tort action. England allows damages for injury to reputation. See Quartz Hill
Consol. Gold Mining Co., 11 Q.B.D. 674 (C.A. 1883); supra note 23.
32. The Restatement espouses the American rule in not requiring proof of special damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681 (1977). But in recognition of the minority
English rule, it provides separate sections for the kinds of special damage that may satisfy the
minority rule. See id. §§ 677 (civil proceedings causing an arrest or deprivation of property),
678 (proceedings alleging insanity or insolvency), 679 (repetition of civil proceedings) and 680
(proceedings before an administrative board). Apparently, however, the presence of one of
these elements of damages, giving rise to a cause of action, does not permit recovery of litiga-
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Under the majority American rule, in addition to these elements of
damage, the present plaintiff can recover for any harm normally resulting from the original action, including harm to reputation and
emotional distress. 33 He can also recover punitive damages if the
facts indicate that they are appropriate.34
4. Lack of Probable Cause.-Perhapsthe most vital single requirement, this element of the cause of action combines with the
next one (malice) to identify the real "sting" of the tortious
35
conduct.
This requirement is unusual in that it places the burden on the
present plaintiff to prove a negative-that there was no probable
cause for bringing the original suit.3 6 It speaks of probable cause
instead of reasonable grounds. The distinction between the two terms
is that the determination of whether there is probable cause is made
by the court as an issue of law, while the determination of whether
there are reasonable grounds is made by the jury as an issue of fact.
Of course, if the pertinent facts are in dispute, the issue may go to
the jury, but the instructions should inform the jury how their findings of fact will affect the ultimate determination. Sometimes a better way of handling this matter is for the judge to submit special
interrogatories to the jury and then to use its responses in ruling on
the issue of probable cause.
Observe that this requirement is expressed in terms of the nature of the original cause of action itself, rather than the nature of
the defendant's conduct in bringing it. Obviously, the suit need not
be certain to prevail; it need not even be more likely to prevail than
not.37 But the claim must be "tenable"-that is, colorable, plausible,
tion expenses. They are not recoverable at all under the minority rule. For a discussion of
repeated suits, see Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
33. See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 903-04 (Ky. 1981) ("pain and suffering, mortification and loss of reputation"); Robinson v. Goudchaux's, 307 So. 2d 287, 291 (La. 1975)
("mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
681 comments b, e (1977).
34. See Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184 (1975) (when malice is shown, damages allowable to punish malicious party); Stalker v.
Drake, 91 Kan. 142, 136 P. 912 (1913) (damages imposed to punish malicious, vindictive
acts).
35. The element of lack of probable cause is objective, dealing with the nature of the
original cause of action, while the element of malice is subjective, dealing with the state of
mind (motive) of the original plaintiff. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 120.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681A (1977).
37. It can be a source of confusion to speak of negligence in deciding that the case will
be won. Instead, the question is the abstract one of whether there is a reasonable chance that
the case can be won.
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logically capable of being maintained, arguably sustainable, not palpably insufficient, have a sound chance of succeeding, justify a reasonable belief in the possibility that the claim will be held valid.38
The claim may be insufficient from the standpoint of the law or
from the standpoint of the existence of the assumed facts and
whether they can be proved. In the first situation, a natural reaction
may be that if the existing decisions in the state are to the effect that
these facts do not constitute a valid cause of action, then the requirement of lack of probable cause has automatically been met. But this
is not necessarily so. Changes in the law are sometimes made judicially; in a particular jurisdiction, if the trend of legal development
on the subject suggests the possibility of further development, or if it
appears that existing precedents on this subject do not accord with
current mores and ideals, either circumstance may give rise to a reasonable inference that this suit might be the vehicle for producing a
change in the law. This would mean that probable cause exists for
bringing the suit. 39
In the second situation (the facts stated in the complaint are
adequate for a cause of action but the question is whether the proof
can sustain them), the language used above in describing the potential adequacy of the claim still applies. The presence of a sound
chance of producing the required proof makes the claim tenable and
supplies the necessary probable cause. But if the original plaintiff
either knows that the alleged facts are not true or does not have an
honest belief in their truth, then the courts usually hold that probable cause is lacking.40 A jury verdict for the plaintiff in the original
38.

All of these expressions have been used, and they may be regarded as essentially

synonymous-different ways of expressing the same idea. Another way of putting the general
idea is to say that lack of probable cause must be very clearly proven or must have been very
palpable.
39. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963); Wade, Recent Developments in Tort Law and the Federal Courts,
72 Ky. L.J. 1,1-5 (1983).
40. In Tool Research and Eng'g Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120 Cal.

Rptr. 291, 297 (1975), the court stated:
An attorney has probable cause to represent a client in litigation when, after a reasonable investigation and industrious search of legal authority, he has an honest

belief that his client's claim is tenable in the forum in which it is to be tried. ...
The test is twofold. The attorney must entertain a subjective belief in that the claim
merits litigation and that belief must satisfy an objective standard.
The requirement of a subjective belief for probable cause may have come about through confu-

sion of the elements of lack of probable cause and presence of malice. On the other hand, it
may be an analog to the rule that the party is held to a knowledge only of the facts that he
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suit has been treated as conclusive proof of probable cause, even
though it is set aside by the court.41

The suit for the tort of malicious civil prosecution may be
brought against the original plaintiff or his attorney, or both. The

original plaintiff may contend, as a defense to the present suit, that
he relied on the advice of his attorney that the suit was warranted.

The success of this defense will depend upon the client's being able
to show that he made full disclosure to the attorney of all pertinent

facts in his possession and honestly relied on the attorney's opinion. 2
Courts sometimes purport to lay down a rule of law on whether
an attorney should be expected to check his client's statement of the

facts for the contemplated suit and to make a reasonable investigation before reaching a decision.43 It would seem, however, that the
determination should depend on his knowledge of the client and his
character and the nature of the circumstances-under many circumstances the client might have misunderstood or erroneously interpreted the actual facts." The attorney who takes a case after an
adequate investigation and a good faith evaluation may properly be
regarded as exercising a professional judgment, which is not subject
to second-guessing by a jury unless it is palpably wrong.4 But in
was aware of or that were reasonably available to him. Cases treating the issue of probable
cause include Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956); Bertero v. National
Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1975); Nelson v. Miller, 227
Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
41. Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26, 55 P. 703 (1898); Cowles v. Carter, 115 Cal.
App. 3d 350, 171 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1981) (judgment n.o.v.). This assumes, of course, that the
original judgment was not obtained by fraud.
42. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184
(1975); Reenan v. Klein, 3 Ohio App. 3d 142, 444 N.E.2d 63 (1981).
There may be difficulty in getting evidence of what the client and attorney said to each
other because of the evidentiary privilege. The privilege is for the benefit of the client, who
controls it. In Mahaffey v. McMahon, 630 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1982), the attorney advised his
client to invoke the privilege, and the court held that the jury might be told of this advisement.
The court noted that, in such cases, invocation of the privilege may make out a prima facie
case of lack of probable cause. Id. at 69.
43. See Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d
990 (1977) and Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (both holding that
attorney was not expected to check his client's statement of facts). But see Fee, Parker &
Lloyd, P.A. v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1119
(Fla. 1980); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
44. If it turns out that the client lied to the attorney, the question is whether the attorney acted reasonably in accepting the factual recitation. More frequently, especially in a situation like medical malpractice, the client's impression of the facts was erroneous. The attorney
should be aware of this and act accordingly.
45. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980) (tactical decision not to
present expert witnesses, when based on honest exercise of professional judgment, does not
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order to reach a mature judgment entitled to this credence, the attorney must have collected the pertinent data and other information

needed for reaching a true professional judgment.46
An attorney may be placed in a difficult predicament when a
client with whom he has no previous acquaintance appears with a
case for which the limitations period is about to expire. It may be
necessary for the attorney to make a hasty judgment to commence

suit without an adequate investigation, and then to conduct his investigation to determine whether to discontinue the -suit. If he does this

and finds that the cause of action is not meritorious, he has another
difficult decision to make, and may find himself caught between the
Scylla of a malpractice suit by his client and the Charybdis of a
malicious prosecution suit by the other party.47 His only way to
render attorney liable for malpractice); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144
(1954); cf.Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney
not liable for every mistake he may make); Haskell, The Trial Lawyer's Immunity from Lia-

bility for Errorsof Judgment, 1979

TRIAL LAW. GUIDE

87.

46. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 360-61, 530 P.2d 589, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,
628 (1975), overruled on other grounds sub nom. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,
544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). The cases in this and the preceding note involve the
liability of an attorney to his client. Clearly no greater responsibility will be imposed on him in
his relationship to a third party whom he is considering suing for his client.
47. In Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978),
plaintiff/client sued his attorney for malpractice in withdrawing from a suit after it was filed.
The client had come to defendant shortly before running of the limitations period. After a
hasty investigation, defendant filed the suit but subsequently withdrew after a more thorough
investigation and after properly offering to assist the client in obtaining a substitute attorney.
When the case was dismissed, the client sued the attorney and obtained a jury verdict for over
$230,000. The case was reversed by the state supreme court. The essence of the opinion is
expressed in this statement:
When apparent conflict exists between the attorney's duty to his client on the one
hand and his public obligation on the other, it is not sufficient to show that some or
many prudent attorneys would not have made the mistake. The attorney's choice to
honor the public obligation must be shown to have been so manifestly erroneous that
no prudent attorney would have done so.
Id. at 304, 578 P.2d at 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 222. Would the same principle have relieved the
attorney of liability if he had decided to continue the case?
Cf. Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), where an attorney acting
under pressure of the statute of limitations joined his client's family physician in an action
against an orthopedic surgeon who had been recommended by the physician, and under the
assumption that the physician was present at the operation (which rendered the client a paraplegic). Later, on discovering that the physician had not participated in the operation, he
agreed not to contest a summary judgment for defendant in the malpractice case. The physician sued for malicious civil prosecution, contending lack of probable cause for the malpractice
action or for continuing it, and obtained a verdict for $25,000. The appellate court reversed,
declaring that the standard
is whether the claim merits litigation against the defendant in question on the basis
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avoid this is to explain to the client from the beginning the significance of the statute of limitations and his reasons for each step in his
course of action.
A practice sometimes followed by plaintiff's attorney in a medical malpractice case is to join as defendants the hospital and all doctors who had any possible connection with the treatment of the patient, and to sort them out at his convenience and dismiss those
against whom he does not wish to proceed. Unless he is impelled by
the proximity of the limitations period, he is likely to find this prac-.
tice dangerous. Joining as defendant a doctor known not to have
the discovery process against
been negligent, for the purpose of 4using
8
him, is likely to produce liability.
5. Malice.-"Malice" is a chameleon word in the law of torts,
carrying a variety of distinct meanings and producing a considerable
amount of confusion in the state of the law of torts as a whole. As
used here for the tort of malicious prosecution (whether of a criminal prosecution or a civil proceeding), it means the misuse of a right
or a privilege for a purpose different from that for which it was established.4 The right of bringing a civil action against another is
established for the purpose of giving the person exercising the right
an opportunity to determine whether his claim is legally justified
and, if it is, to obtain a remedy that the law provides. This opportunity is not properly available to him if his claim lacks probable
cause. If he is aware of the fact that his claim does lack probable
cause, then he is bringing it for a purpose other than that for which
the tort action was established, and malice, or ulterior purpose, is
present5 0
This element of awareness that the original suit was without
merit is similar to the element of fraud (scienter) in the tort of deceit, which Lord Herschell declared in 1889 exists when a "false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its
of the facts known to the attorney when suit is commenced. The question is answered by determining that no competent and reasonable attorney familiar with the
law of the forum would consider that the claim was worthy of litigation on the basis
of facts known by the attorney who instituted suit.
Id. at 1288 (footnote omitted).
48. See Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
49. The Restatement even changes the name of this requirement from "malice" to "propriety of purpose." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 (1977).
50. Cf.authorities cited supra note 4 (discussing the continental doctrine of abuse of
rights).
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truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." 51 From
this developed the concept of "actual malice" (more appropriately
called constitutional malice), held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan52 to be necessary in a defamation action brought by a public
official, and defined as proof that the defendant made the defamatory statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."53 As in defamation, malice
may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the very existence
of a palpable lack of probable cause for the original suit constitutes
circumstantial evidence that the original plaintiff must have been
aware of this and thus must have had an ulterior motive in bringing
4
the suit.
There are other situations in which an ulterior purpose may
supply the requirement of malice. For example, the original plaintiff
may be suing solely (or primarily) for the purpose of harassing the
defendant. This is similar to malice in the sense of hostility or ill
will, but the mere presence of ill will does not meet the requirement
in this situation. For another example, the original action may be
brought as a nuisance suit with knowledge that it is without merit,
but with the purpose of forcing the defendant to agree to a settlement in order to avoid the greater expenses of litigation. 5 If the
attorney for the original plaintiff is aware of his client's ulterior motive he also may be held to have the necessary malice, but the client's malice is not imputed to an attorney who was unaware of it and
who has been found to have acted in good faith.58
It must be quite apparent that the two requirements of lack of
probable cause and malice are inextricably connected, and neither
can be fully explained without bringing in the other. Thus, the comments set out in the discussion of lack of probable cause concerning
the relationship between the client and the attorney in bringing the
original action are equally relevant here in the discussion of malice.
These two elements combine to constitute the gist of the tort of
malicious civil prosecution. The courts hold that both must be found
to be present in order to prevail in a suit for malicious civil prosecu51.
52.
53.

Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.

54. The converse is not true. Existence of malice does not constitute circumstantial evidence of lack of probable cause.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 comment c (1977).
56. Maechtlen v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 250 P. 303 (1926); Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo.
138, 3 S.W. 577 (1887).
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tion. The expression "bad faith" is sometimes used as indicating the
combined effect of the two concepts. Each concept, however, carries

a separate meaning of its own, and both ideas should be borne in
mind in reaching a balanced result.
B.

57
Abuse of Process

Abuse of process is a separate tort, often confused with malicious civil prosecution. It is concerned not with the institution and
conduct of a cause of action, but with the use made of an individual

legal process.
In Graingerv. Hill,58 the first case in which the tort was recog-

nized, defendants, who held a mortgage on a ship owned by the
plaintiff, brought an action of debt against him and used the process
of arrest to require him to deliver the register of the ship to them.
Unable to raise bail and obtain his release, he was compelled to deliver the register, without which he could not sail. Action was upheld
for abuse of the process of arrest.
The case of Board of Education v. Farmingdale Classroom

Teachers Association,59 is more contemporary. In litigation between
the parties, the Teachers Association served subpoenas on all of the
teachers in a school system, requiring them to report to court at the
same time, thus seriously interfering with the operation of the
schools. Again, abuse of the subpoena process was held to be

actionable. 60
57. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN, supra note 12, § 121; Special Project,
Third-Party Actions Against Attorneys: Abuse of Process, 33 S.C. L. REV. 331 (1981); Note,
Torts-Abuse of Process Defined, 28 ARK. L. REV. 388 (1974); Note, Abuse of Process, 13
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 163 (1964); Note, Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood Concept, 20
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 401 (1971); Note, Abuse of Process: A Gap in Alabama Law, 10 CUMB. L.
REV. 209 (1979); Note, The Nature and Limitations of the Remedy Available to the Victim
of a Misuse of the Legal Process: The Tort of Abuse of Process, 2 VAL U.L. REV. 129
(1967); Annotation, 97 A.L.R.3d 688 (1980).
58. 4 Bing. N.C. 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838).
59. 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
60. Various kinds of legal process can be abused and thus subject the actor to liability
under this tort. In addition to seizure of the person and subpoena for appearance, liability has
been imposed for abuse of garnishment or attachment, levy of execution, sequestration, and
discovery proceedings. See, e.g., Haggerty v. Moyerman, 321 Pa. 555, 558-59, 184 A. 654, 655
(1936) (execution); Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 923-24, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145,
149 (1976) (abuse of discovery); cf. Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 374, 7 N.E.2d 268, 270
(1937) (no abuse of process and no recovery in suit to have present plaintiff declared
incompetent).
The action does not lie for the filing of a groundless suit. See, e.g., Wells v. Orthwein, 670
S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Brault v. Smith, 679 P.2d 236 (Mont. 1984); Key Bank v.
Lake Placid Co., 103 A.D.2d 19, 479 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1984); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d
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Observe that in both of these cases the process was actually and
effectively issued. The procurement of the process was not the tort; it
was the use of it for an improper purpose that constituted the
abuse."1 The name of this tort action frankly says as much, and does
not resort to use of the word "malicious" in an unnatural fashion.
Observe also that the process issued without the participation of
the injured party or any opportunity on his part to appear and contest its, issuance. The proceeding was ex parte. As a result, there was
no need in the lawsuit for abuse of process to allege or prove that the
outcome of the issuance of the process was favorable to the present
plaintiff or to show lack of probable cause. These elements are not
necessary when there is no opportunity for a hearing. Indeed, in the
case of malicious civil prosecution, there is also no requirement of
showing favorable termination when the proceedings are ex parte
62
and the original defendant had no opportunity to contest them.
Courts have looked with more favor on abuse of process than on
malicious civil prosecution. Although the two torts are quite different
and need to be carefully distinguished, their similarity has not infrequently produced confusion in the understanding of some courts,
with erroneous decisions resulting.63
C. Negligence and Other Standard Torts
In an action for negligence, the plaintiff's injury to his person or
property does not have to be physical. It may instead be economic.
There have been numerous suits based on negligence brought by an
original defendant against the person who brought the original suit
against him and lost. Most frequently, the suit is brought against the
lawyer who brought the original suit for his client, apparently on the
theory that it is easier to prove negligence on the part of the attor763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
61. Representative abuse of process cases include Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 194 A.
174 (N.J. 1937) (writ for body execution obtained over weekend while judge out of town);
Dishaw v. Wadleigh, 15 A.D. 205, 17 N.Y.S. 207 (1897) (defendant arranged nominal assign-

ment to person some distance away, to get subpoena to owner to testify, incurring expense of
travel); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg 84 A.D.2d 573, 573, 443 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (1981)

(wife

charged that in divorce action, defendant used subpoena process "for the unjustified purpose of
harassing her and exhausting her financial resources, in order to win a collateral advantage in

the legal struggle over custody of the child"); Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. 190 (1865) (second writ
of execution issued after knowing obligation had been paid).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 comment k (1977).
63. See, e.g., Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980). An important remedy in addition to the tort action discussed here is suit in restitution. For a thorough study, see
Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 571 & 679 (1947).
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ney. Uniformly, these suits have been unsuccessful. 64 Some courts
have relied on the traditional requirement of privity of contract, despite the continuing and broadening erosion of that requirement.
Others cite the conflict of interests that would be created if the attorney must temper his zeal and efforts on behalf of his client with
an awareness that he must be careful to protect his personal interest
in not subjecting himself to a possible negligence suit in case he
should go too far.65
The principal reason why the courts have not been ready to recognize the availability of a negligence suit in this situation, I suggest,
is that we already have a tort action developed by the common law
specifically as a remedy for the bringing of an ungrounded civil action. Over the years this remedy of malicious civil prosecution has
been carefully constructed and delicately balanced to give due
weight to the different interests involved. To apply the open-ended
action of negligence to this factual situation now would result in discarding all of the refinements and restrictions specially developed by
the law. True, the particular action of malicious civil prosecution is
proving in some states to be too restrictive and therefore not adequate. The solution to this problem, however, is to adjust the action
in the light of experience, and not to cast it aside in favor of a general action of negligence.
In some suits for frivolous action, the complainants have relied
on various ethical rules and standards of professional conduct and
responsibility, and have contended that the attorney for the plaintiff
in the original action violated a specific rule or standard in bringing
the action. This appears to amount essentially to an action in negligence, with the violation being treated as negligence per se. Two
64. Representative cases include: Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922-23, 123
Cal. Rptr. 237, 241 (1975); Pantone v. Demos, 59 I11.App. 3d 328, 335-36, 375 N.E.2d 480,
485 (1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 289, 607 P.2d 438, 451 (1980); Friedman v.
Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 27, 312 N.W.2d 585, 593 (1981); cf. De Luca v. Whatley, 42 Cal. App.

3d 574, 117 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1974) (malicious criminal prosecution; attorney not liable for calling plaintiff as witness, knowing that plaintiff would incriminate himself).
Recovery was granted on the basis of negligence in Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653 (Mont. 1981), but the facts were distinguishable. Defendant insurance
company negligently sued the wrong plaintiff, who notified defendant that he was not the right
person but did not defend the case. Judgment by default was entered against him and he
brought this action in negligence. The jury awarded $850 for compensatory damages and
$80,000 for punitive damages. The supreme court let the award for punitive damages stand
but reduced the actual damages award for contributory negligence.
65. E.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 2d 917, 922-23, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240-41
(1975); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 2-3, 312 N.W.2d 585, 591-94 (1981).
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comments seem appropriate: (1) calling the conduct negligence per
se still leaves the action as one in negligence, and negligence actions
are not available in this situation; and (2) ethical rules and standards
for the legal profession have not been construed as adopted for the
protection of third persons (persons other than the client) and have
therefore not been regarded as a suitable basis on which to raise a
68
cause of action.

The contention has sometimes been made that the law should
impose liability on an attorney for willful and wanton conduct in
bringing a groundless suit or for intentionally bringing one that he
knows to lack any merit. 67 This, of course, is essentially what the tort
of malicious civil prosecution purports to. do, and the courts have
shown no inclination to try to create a new and different cause of
action.
D. Other Suggested Tort Bases for Imposing Liability

Some states, notably New York, have espoused a view known as
the prima facie tort theory, which would impose liability upon a de-

fendant who commits an intentional act, knowing that it will cause
injury to the plaintiff, provided the injury was actually incurred and
the defendant does not have suitable justification for his conduct.68
Application of this concept to the bringing of a frivolous lawsuit received a short-lived acceptance by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,69 but the case was reversed by a memo66. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il1. App. 3d 940, 953, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763,
770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (no action on basis of negligence per se or of breach of professional
responsibility).
On the Code of Professional Responsibility and the contention that the court should create or recognize a private cause of action for intentional violation, see Bob Godfrey Pontiac,
Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981).
App. 3d
67. This contention was upheld by the trial court in Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979), but it was repudiated by the
appellate court. See also Pantone v. Demos, 59 I1l. App. 3d 328, 336, 375 N.E.2d 480, 484
(1978) (in order to safeguard access to the courts this new action will not be recognized). See
generally Thode, The Groundless Case-the Lawyer's Tort Duty to His Client and to the
Adverse Party, II ST. MARY'S L.J. 59 (1979).
68. See Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343
N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975); Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle,54
Nw. U.L. REV. 563 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the "PrimaFacie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
69. Drago v. Buonagurio, 61 A.D.2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, rev'd 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386
N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
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randum decision of the court of appeals. 7 0 No other courts have been
71
ready to accept the tort concept in this situation.
Reference has sometimes been made to constitutional and statutory provisions providing that there shall be a remedy for every
wrong and to the common law maxim to the same effect, but they
have not been made the basis of any holding of liability.7 2 Similar
reference to the nature of the common law action of trespass on the
case or to the Statute of Westminster II has also been ineffective.
The same is true of efforts to revive the common law crimes of
champerty, maintenance, and barratry, and to turn them into torts
applicable to the bringing of a frivolous lawsuit. 73
E. Appraisal of the Tort Actions
This survey of the tort actions that have been resorted to in
seeking to recover tort damages for the bringing of an unjustifiable
civil action should make it clear that there is only one tort that the
courts are ready to recognize as suitable for that purpose-the one
here designated as malicious civil prosecution. 4 Courts have looked
openly with disfavor on this tort, and there are comparatively few
cases in which it has been successfully maintained.7 5 The restrictions
70. Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
71. See, e.g., Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979).
72. ILL. CONsT. art. 1, § 12 provides: "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." This was held not
applicable to a frivolous action because it is "an expression of a philosophy and not a mandate
that a 'certain remedy' be provided in any specific form or that the nature of the proof necessary to the award of a judgment or decree continue without modification." Berlin v. Nathan,
64 I1. App. 3d 940, 950, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1374 (1978) (quoting Sullivan v. Midlothian Park
District, 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277, 281 N.E.2d 659, 662 (1972), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979).
See also O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 520, 569 P.2d 561, 565 (1977) (discussing art. I, §
10 of Oregon Constitution and stating that "it would be ironic to derive a looser test of malicious prosecution from a constitutional guarantee of access to the courts").
73. See Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I1. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 828 (1979).
74. The action for abuse of process is not counted here because it is not a remedy for the
bringing of a frivolous action, but for the improper use or abuse of a particular process.
75. Recovery was allowed, for example, in Stevens v. Chisholm, 179 Cal. 557, 562-63,
178 P. 128, 130-31 (1919) (action by attorney against his former client when she sued him for
fraud; lack of probable cause and presence of malice held clearly proved); Raine v. Drasin, 621
S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Reenan v. Klein, 3 Ohio App. 3d 142, 143, 444 N.E.2d 63, 65 (1981)
(landlord eviction without basis); Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1980) ("groundless, spurious and false claim"); cf. Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d
957 (1980) (court applied rules for abuse of process).
In a number of additional cases, a holding for the defendant at the trial court was sent
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placed on it are quite onerous, and the special damage rule adopted
in many states makes the action completely unavailable in the normal situation where plaintiff incurred no special damages. 7 Quite
clearly, there is real need for a careful reevaluation of the policies
underlying the action.
One objection made to the action is that it contends that the
first suit should not have been brought, and then seeks to cure one
unnecessary suit clogging the courts by the bringing of another suit,
clogging them even further. Is it an anomaly to bring one suit to
alleviate the harm caused by another? The superficiality of this argument becomes apparent with the realization that all torts require
an action in order to obtain a remedy.
Another objection sometimes made to the action is that a plaintiff's knowledge that he and his attorney may be subject to tort liability if his cause of action proves to be groundless will have the
effect of chilling their readiness to seek relief in the courts and thus
acts as a deterrent to bringing suit at all. The answer to this is that a
significant purpose of tort law is to deter tortious conduct, and it is
only when the original suit was not even tenable-i.e., susceptible of
a reasonable argument-that the second action may lie. Another
purpose of tort law is to provide compensation to the injured party,
and a person subjected to a groundless suit has certainly suffered
pecuniary loss.77
Still a third objection is the "shuttlecock" argument. If the original defendant brings an action against the original plaintiff for malicious civil prosecution and loses, the latter may then retaliate with a
similar action, and the shuttlecock would be passed back and forth
indefinitely. This is not just the product of an uncontrolled imagination; it has actually happened on occasion.78 But it hardly seems a
serious danger that should have the effect of eliminating the availability of a suitable remedy for a true tort injury.
back for a new trial. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
76. There is real need for a change in the special damage rule in the states taking the

minority view, if the tort is to prove useful. The medical malpractice cases in jurisdictions
following the doctrine of special damage demonstrate that no tort remedy is available at all.
77. The analogy of the "chilling argument" to the law of defamation and the first
amendment is apparent. There, the solution was not to abolish the tort action but to put the
tight restriction of constitutional malice on it. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. A

similar solution may be applied here.
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 I11.619, 629-30, 51 N.E. 569, 572
(1898). And see Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), where the facts
indicate that the "shuttlecock" situation may have developed.
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On the other side, it has been argued strongly that the tort ac-

tion should be expanded to cover a broader range of tort liability.
Thus, a recent article urges that the defendant, like the plaintiff,
should also be subject to tort liability if he is aware that his defense
has no merit, and he is acting only to harass the plaintiff by delaying
the action and making the recovery more expensive. 9 Judicial support for this position has been slight, and there are few cases in
which the issue has been raised. 80 The courts might be hesitant to
allow recovery in a separate tort action against either the original

plaintiff or defendant if there was a tenable count or defense and the
party had added another count or defense that clearly had no
merit.8 1
A second suggestion urges that the original defendant be permitted to file a counterclaim to the original action, so that both torts

may be handled in the same trial. 2 This would probably require
statutory action, since the original defendant cannot, at the time he
files the counterclaim, claim that the action had terminated in his
favor. This idea has engendered some support.8 3
Before attempting to present a complete appraisal of the tort

action of malicious civil prosecution, however, I think it would be
desirable to consider other remedies, sanctions, and legal devices for
controlling the bringing of frivolous actions. Then a more comprehensive evaluation of the total problem will be possible.
79. Van Patten & Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposalfor the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891 (1984). See also Levinson, Bertero
National General Corp.: Drawing the Line Between an Aggressive Defense and Malicious
Prosecution, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739 (1977); Note, Controlling the Malicious Defendant, 2 STAN. L. REv. 184 (1949).
80. See dicta in Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 469-70, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897); Cisson
v. Pickens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 43, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1972). For a case
holding that an action will not lie, see Baxter v. Brown, 83 Kan. 302, 111 P. 430 (1910)
(verified general denial with alleged knowledge that complaint was true; no affirmative
defense).
81. But see Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 289 P.2d 794 (1955), involving a criminal prosecution, instituted by the present defendant against the present plaintiff, with separate
charges of theft of an automobile and theft of other personal property. Both charges were
dismissed after a preliminary hearing, and plaintiff brought two actions for malicious prosecution, which were consolidated into one. The jury found a reasonable basis for the personal
property charge, but none for the automobile charge. The court held that the plaintiff could
recover on the one charge, recovering attorney's fees for defending both. Id. at 496-98, 289
P.2d at 799-800.
82. See Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 12, at 1233.
83. See statutes cited infra notes 146, 147.
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III.

OTHER LEGAL METHODS FOR TREATING THE PROBLEM OF
FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION

A.

State Statutes and Rules

1. Statutory Treatments of Frivolous Civil Litigation.-During
recent years a number of state legislatures have sought to alter or
improve the common law remedies for frivolous litigation. One state
has modified its common law action for malicious civil prosecution,
and others have provided a remedy for the frivolous action by authorizing or directing the judge to award attorney's fees in that same
action to the other party.
Pennsylvania (1980)84 is the state codifying the common law
tort action.85 The new provisions follow the Restatement (Second) of
Torts rather closely, naming the tort action "wrongful use of civil
proceedings" (thus eliminating serious semantic confusion with
abuse of process), and specifically changing the minority special
damage rule by providing that seizure of the person or property of
the plaintiff is no longer necessary. Malice and lack of probable
cause are both requirements of the action, but proof that the defendant acted "in a grossly negligent fashion" may substitute for lack of
probable cause. 86 Malice is acting "primarily for the purpose other
than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim."''1 A person has probable cause if he "reasonably believes in the existence of the facts on which the claim is based"
and either:
(1) Reasonably believes that under those facts the claim may be
valid under the existing or developing law; (2) Believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of counsel, sought in good faith and
given after full disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge
and information; or (3) Believes as an attorney of record, in good
faith that [the suit] is not intended to merely harass or maliciously
injure the opposite party. 88
There is no reference in the Act to attorney's fees or a "malicious
defense," and it has been held under the Act that a counterclaim
84.

The date in parentheses after the name of a state indicates when the statute was

passed. Several dates indicate amendments.
85. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8351-8354 (Purdon 1982).
86. Id. § 8351(1).
87.
88.

Id.
Id.

§

8352(3).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:433

cannot be filed.89
The several statutes providing for award of litigation expenses

or attorney's fees in the original action are numerous enough to be
treated individually.
California (1981, 1984, 1985) uses as its test "bad-faith actions
or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay."9' 0 Frivolous is defined as "totally and completely without
merit or.

.

. for the purpose of harassing an opposing party." 1 Ac-

tions or tactics "include filing and serving of a complaint or crosscomplaint and the making and opposing of motions. 92 The court's
action is discretionary, and may be taken against a party, his attorney, or both. This remedy is in addition to other existing ones. It
would apparently apply to defenses, and such matters as the filing of
motions.93
The current Colorado statute (1986) comprises six sections, including a "legislative declaration," or finding. 94 It provides for the
court, upon motion of any party or the court itself, to award "reasonable attorney fees against any attorney or party who has brought or
defended a civil action, either in whole or in part," if it finds that the
action or defense: (1) "lacked substantial justification," (2) was "interposed for delay or harassment" or (3) was "unnecessarily ex89. Sheridan v. Fox, 531 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
90. CAL, CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
91. Id. § 128.5(b)(2).
92. Id. § 128.5(b)(1).
93. There are numerous decisions under the California statute. Perhaps the one of most
significance is Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Stockton Port Dist., 140 Cal. App. 3d Il1,
189 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1983). Plaintiff's property had been damaged by failure of a levee. It sued
several defendants for negligence and included the Port District because of a six-month limitations period for action against a governmental agency. Not knowing whether the Port was
negligent, plaintiff used discovery processes against the other defendants and on the basis of
the information acquired, dismissed the action against the Port District with prejudice. The
trial court awarded attorney fees, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that there was no
improper motive. See also People v. Johnson, 157 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 204 Cal. Rptr. 563,
565 (1984) (criminal prosecution dismissed because People not ready; trial judge should have
given notice and opportunity to be heard); Corralejo v. Quiroga, 152 Cal. App. 3d 871, 87274, 199 Cal. Rptr. 733, 734-35 (1984) (requirement of notice and written statement of trial
court reciting circumstances justifying sanctions); Gumabao v. Gumabao, 150 Cal. App. 3d
572, 578, 198 Cal. Rptr. 90, 94 (1984) (failure of attorney to notify other party or court of his
being unable to appear); Karwasky v. Zachay, 146 Cal. App. 3d 679, 681, 194 Cal. Rptr. 292,
294 (1983) (motion to disqualify defendant's attorney not made in good faith); Ellis v. Roshei
Corp., 143 Cal. App. 3d 642, 648-50, 192 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61-62 (1983) (attorney filing demurrer to cross complaint on grounds initially valid, but cured by other party's offer to supply
needs, subject to sanctions for insisting on demurrer for purposes of harassment or delay).
94. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-17-101 to 13-17-106 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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panded . . . by other improper conduct," including discovery

abuses.9 5 The expression "lacked substantial justification" is defined
to mean "substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious." 96 Other provisions state that fees are not to be
awarded if the party or attorney voluntarily dismisses the action
when he becomes aware or should have been aware that the action
would not succeed, or if the action was based on "a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in Colorado. ' 7 A separate
section provides for "judicial discretion" in assessing the amount of
the fees and states eight factors to be taken into consideration in

making the determination."8
Connecticut has a code section going back to the last century,

which provides:
Any allegation or denial made without reasonable cause and
found untrue shall subject the party pleading the same to the payment of reasonable expenses, to be taxed by the court, as may have
been necessarily incurred by the other party by reason of such untrue pleading; provided no expenses for counsel fees shall be taxed
exceeding $10 for any one offense. 99

The same provision is also found in the Superior Court Rules100 with
two changes: (1) the cap for counsel fees is increased from $10 to
$250; (2) an added sentence states that the "expenses shall be taxed
against the offending party whether he prevails in the action or
not."101 An early case under the code held that "[a] plea of a gen95. Id. § 13-17-102 (2), (4). Subsections (1) and (2) disagree on whether the court
"may" or "shall" award "reasonable attorney fees."
96. Id. § 13-17-102(4). "Frivolous" apparently refers to the legal basis for the suit.
97. Id. § 13-17-102(7).
98. Id. § 13-17-103. In International Technical Instruments v. Engineering Measurements Co., 678 P.2d 558, 563 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), the appellate court adopted two definitions from the trial court. A claim or defense is frivolous "if the proponent can present no
rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of his or her claim or defense .. " A groundless claim is "one in which the complaint contains allegations sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but which are not supported by any
credible evidence at trial." Id. The state supreme court, in Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674
P.2d 363, 366 (Colo. 1984), utilized the test for frivolousness in regard to a claim for frivolous
appeal under Appellate Rule 38, but added to it, "or the appeal is prosecuted for the sole
purpose of harrassment or delay." The last clause would seem more appropriate as a definition
for "vexatious." See also Morton v. Allied Stores Corp., 90 F.R.D. 352, 357 (D. Colo. 1981)
(court used Webster's Third New International Dictionary definition of vexatious).
99.

CONN.

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§

52-99 (West 1960).

100. Conn. Super. Court Rules § 111 (1986).
101. This sentence may have been derived from the holding in Erwin M. Jennings Co. v.
Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 141 A. 866 (1928).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:433

eral denial, when there are any material allegations in the complaint
which the defendant knows to be true, subjects him to the payment
of any reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by the plaintiff to
establish their truth. 10 2 A more recent Connecticut amendment
(1986) further provides that:
Any person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or
complaint against another. . . or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or
(2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to
vex and trouble . . . such other person, shall pay him treble
o
damages 103

Florida (1978) has a short section providing for a reasonable
attorney's fee, which the court "shall" award.10 4 The test is "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the
losing party."105
Georgia's statute (1986) provides that "attorney's fees and expenses of litigation shall be awarded" against a party (and his attorney) who "asserted a claim, defense or other position" for which
"there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law
or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would
accept" it.10 6 Another part of the section provides for the awarding
of attorney's fees or expenses of litigation if a party or attorney
102. Hatch v. Thompson, 67 Conn. 74, 76, 34 A. 770, 771 (1895).
103. Public Act 86-338 sec. 9, 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. 409 (West) (repealing CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. 52-568).

104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1986).
105. Id. The section has been held constitutional. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins.
Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982) (statute's purpose is to discourage baseless claims, stonewall defenses and sham appeals). There is a surprisingly large number of cases construing the
section. For a few of the more meaningful ones, see Builders Shoring and Scaffolding v. King,
453 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (statute does not apply when party raises novel
application of law or merely because the plaintiff's position was held erroneous on the merits
or when at least some of the counts were arguable); Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2d 938
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (attorney successfully defending frivolous suit against him can recover for his own time and effort); Ferm v. Saba, 444 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (action must be so clearly devoid of merit, both on facts and law, as to be completely
untenable); Wright v. Acierno, 437 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (the penalty is
mandatory if the court finds there is no justiciable issue raised by the losing party); T.I.E.
Communications, Inc. v. Toyota Motors Center, Inc., 391 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (action must be frivolous to permit recovery, so as not to deter the future growth of the
law), See Spence & Roth, Closing the Courthouse Door: Florida'sSpurious Claims Statute,
10 STETSON L. REv. 397 (1981).
106. GA. CoDE ANN. 9-15-14 (a) (Supp. 1986).
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"brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay or harassment or . . unnecessarily expanded the
proceeding by other improper conduct, including . . .abuse of discovery procedures.107 The phrase "lacked substantial justification"
is defined as meaning "substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious."10 8
The state supreme court supplemented the statute in its decision
of Yost v. Torok, 0 9 redesigning the common law actions into a single cause of action, which it redefined as follows:
Any party who shall assert a claim, defense, or other position
with respect to which there exists such a complete absence of any
justiciable issue of law or fact that it reasonably could not be believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or
other position; or any party who shall bring or defend an action, or
any party thereof, that lacks substantial justification, or is interposed for delay or harassment; or any party who unnecessarily expands the proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not
limited to, abuses of discovery procedures, shall be liable in tort to
an opposing party who suffers damage thereby."'
Hawaii (1980) provides that the court may assess an attorney's
fee up to twenty-five percent of the amount claimed by the party
assessed upon a "specific finding that the claim was completely
frivolous .. ."I
Illinois (1982) provides:
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and
found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the
payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other
party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable
attorneys' fee to be summarily taxed by the court12upon motion
1
made within 30 days of the judgment or dismissal.

Prior to 1976, the quoted sentence included the phrase "and not in
good faith," immediately following "without reasonable cause," and
meant that the cases prior to that time usually turned on the issue of
107.
108.

GA. CODE ANN. 9-15-14(b) (Supp. 1986).
Id.

109. 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414 (1986).
110. Id. at 96, 344 S.E.2d at 417-18.
Ill. HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-14.5 (Supp. 1984).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
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good faith.'1 " The current language is construed to mean that the
moving party "knew or reasonably should have known" that the
statements of fact were untrue.114 Indeed, prior to 1961, the statute
was essentially unenforced. "15 The statute has been treated as both
penal and remedial, but as the court declared in Dayan v. McDonald's Corp.," 6 "once it has been established that a litigant has
abused his right of free access to our court system by intentionally or
recklessly pleading false matters, no rational purpose is served by
strictly construing the scope of the resulting section 2-611 award."" 7
This case also holds that: (1) destruction of evidence or presentation
of false evidence permits an inference of lack of reasonable cause,
(2) amendment of the pleadings does not prevent application of the
statute if the amended pleading still has the false allegation; and (3)
attorney's fees may cover the whole preparation and trial, including
a preliminary injunction granted to the offending party on the basis
of its false allegations, argument on the motion under the statute and
appeal, and trial and interpreter fees." 8 The statute is applicable to
statements in or about a motion." 9 The court may act on its own
motion when the falsity is apparent in a pleading. 20
The court may
2
apply the sanction without the need of a hearing.' '
Kansas (1982) provides:
At the time of assessment of the costs

. . .

if the court finds

that a party, in a pleading, motion or response thereto, has asserted
a claim or defense, including setoffs and counterclaims, or has denied the truth of a factual statement in a pleading or during discov113. There is a good treatment of the historical development of the section in Dayan v.
McDonald's Corp., 126 III. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945 (1984).

114.

Id. at 16, 466 N.E.2d at 949. See Third Establishment, Inc. v. 1931 North Park

Apartments, 93 III. App. 3d 234, 417 N.E.2d 167 (1981).
115. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 126 Iil. App. 3d 11, 14, 466 N.E.2d 945, 948 (1984).
The seminal case of Ready v. Ready, 33 Ill.
App. 2d 145, 178 N.E.2d 650 (1961) first held

that the sanction should be applied.
116.

126 III. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945 (1984).

117. Id. at 24, 466 N.E.2d at 954. See Levine, Section 41 of the Civil PracticeAct: The
Sleeper Awakes, 54 ILL. B.J. 388 (1965).
118.

126 Ill. App. 3d at 21-22, 25-26, 28-29, 466 N.E.2d at 953, 955, 958. The facts in

Dayan are quite interesting. Dayan sued McDonald's as the franchisee for the restaurants in
Paris, France, to enjoin it from terminating the franchises for failing to maintain proper quality service and cleanliness standards. The court affirmed the action of the trial court in awarding McDonald's $1,536,472.55 as attorney's fees and $306,433.13 in expenses pursuant to § 2611.
119.
120.
121.

Fenocchi v. Morrison, 7 II!. App. 3d 577, 288 N.E.2d 130 (1972).
Id.
Brokaw Hospital v. Circuit Court, 52 Il.2d 182, 287 N.E.2d 472 (1972).
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ery, without a reasonable basis in fact and not in good faith, the
court shall assess against the party as additional costs of the action,
and allow to the other parties, reasonable attorney fees and exby the other parties as a result of such claim, depenses incurred 122
fense or denial.
The attorney is also liable individually or jointly and severally
"where the court finds that the attorney knowingly and not in good
faith asserted such a claim, defense or denial or, having gained
knowledge of its falsity, failed to inform the court promptly
. . ,"123 The purpose of the section is said "not to prevent a party
litigants
from litigating bona fide claims or defenses but to protect
124
from harassment and expense in clear cases of abuse.
Maryland (1984), in the Rules of General Provisions, provides:
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any
party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith
or without substantial justification the court may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them
to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred
by the adverse party in opposing it. 125
Court decisions indicate that this rule applies to both plaintiff and
defendant, 126 does not cover a reasonable attempt to introduce a new
cause of action in tort,1 27 and treats "bad faith" as including an action taken for the purpose of causing unjustifiable delay. 28
Massachusetts (1978) uses as a test, whether the "claim[s], defenses, setoffs or counterclaims [were] wholly insubstantial, frivolous
and not advanced in good faith," but the finding may not be made
"solely because a novel or unusual argument or principle of law was
advanced. 129 Motion is made at the end of the trial and the "court
may determine, after a trial and distinct finding" to award "reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred in defending
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
discussing
127.
128.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 60-2007(b)(d) (1983).

Id. § 60-2007(b).
Id. § 60-2007(d).
MD.GEN. PROV. CODE ANN. § 1-341 (1986).
See Bastian v. Laffin, 54 Md. App. 703, 719, 460 A.2d 623, 632 (1983) (court
rule 604(b), predecessor of § 1-341).
See Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md. App. 122, 127-29, 485 A.2d 270, 272-73 (1985).
See Blanton v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 61 Md. App. 158, 163, 485 A.2d 694, 697

(1985).
129. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1985).
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against such claims."1 30 If a frivolous defense causes the withholding
of money, interest at one hundred and fifty percent of the statutory
rate is granted. This remedy is in addition to any existing remedy.131
Michigan (1986) recently enacted a statute which provides:
(1) Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or
defense to a civil action was frivolous, the court that conducts the
civil action shall award to the prevailing party the costs and fees
incurred by that party in connection with the civil action by assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and their
attorney.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Frivolous" means that at least 1 of the following conditions
is met:
(i) The party's primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the defense was to harass, embarrass, or injure the
prevailing party.
(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the
facts underlying the party's legal position were in fact true.
(iii) The2 party's legal position was devoid of arguable legal
13
merit.
Minnesota (1982, 1986) uses as a test, whether a "party or attorney . . . acted in bad faith; asserted a claim or defense that is
frivolous and that is costly to the other party; asserted an unfounded
position solely to delay the ordinary course of the proceedings or to
harass; or committed a fraud upon the court. ' 133 The test does not
include "a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of the existing law.11 3 4 The court acts on motion of a party
and at its discretion may award "costs, disbursements, reasonable
18
attorney fees and witness fees.
North Dakota (1977) states a test of whether the "claim for
130.

Id. (emphasis added). See Lewis v. Emerson, 391 Mass. 517, 522 n.6, 462 N.E.2d

295, 301 n.6 (1984) (in assessing damages, attention should be paid to conduct of the defendant during litigation, not to conduct prior to trial).
131. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1985). But cf. Doucette v. Kwiat, 392
Mass. 915, 467 N.E.2d 1374 (1984) (no application if one count valid, though others

frivolous).
132.
133.

Act of July 6, 1986, § 2591 (to be printed at 1986 Mich. Pub. Acts 178).
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West Supp. 1987).

134. Id.
135. Id. Although not expressly stated, the "bad faith" clause is confined to bad faith as
to an issue in litigation. See Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement
Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 1980).
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' 13 6

The "court may, in its discretion, . . . award
reasonable actual or statutory costs, or both, including reasonable
attorney's fees" if it finds that "there is such a complete absence of
actual facts or law that a reasonable person could not have thought a
court would render judgment in their favor. 13s7 The prevailing party
must have8 alleged the frivolous nature of the claim in responsive
13
pleading.
Oregon (1983) provides that "the court may, in its discretion,
award reasonable attorney fees appropriate in the circumstances to a
party against whom a claim, defense or ground for appeal or review
is asserted" if the court finds that the other party "wilfully disobeyed
a court order or acted in bad faith, wantonly or solely for oppressive
139
reasons."
South Dakota (1984) provides:
relief was frivolous.

If a cause of action against any person is dismissed, and the
court determines that the cause of action was frivolous or brought
for malicious purposes, the court may order the plaintiff to pay any
or all costs incurred by the person in defending the cause of action,
including reasonable attorney's fees.140
Utah (1981) succinctly provides that "the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith." 41
Washington (1983) provides that if a trial judge in a civil action
"upon final judgment" makes written findings "that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and
advanced without reasonable cause, [he may] require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing" the pleading of the non136.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01 (Supp. 1985).

137. Id.
138. Id. See Moritz v. Medical Arts Clinic, P.C., 315 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1982); In re
Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1982) (both construing the section).
139. OR. REV. STAT. § 20.108 (1985). See Comment, Courts are No Placefor Fun and
Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious Litigants and Over-zealous Attorneys, 20 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 441 (1984).
140. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-17-35 (1984).
141. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1986). See Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983) (action may be without merit, but must also lack good faith; this means action

lacking an honest, although ill-formed, belief in the claim, an intent to take an unconscionable
advantage of the other party, or an intent to hinder, delay or defraud the other party). See

also Note, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions, 1984
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'
prevailing party. Determination is "made upon post-trial motion." 142

Wisconsin (1977) declares that the court "shall award

. . .

rea-

sonable attorney fees" if it finds "an action or special proceeding
• . .or a counterclaim, defense or cross complaint
14
'

. . .

to be frivo-

This requires a finding that the action was brought or continued "in bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously
injuring another" or that the party or the attorney "knew, or should
have known" that the action "was without any reasonable basis in
law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." 144
Some states have adopted a rule of court corresponding to Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, some of them without its
1983 modifications and some with them. Since this rule will be given
1 45
more detailed treatment later, I merely give citations here.
Other states have statutory provisions applicable to frivolous litigation in particular types of suits or certain aspects of the litigation
process. For example, two states authorize a counterclaim based on
the concept of malicious civil prosecution. Tennessee provides that
the principal action must have been "instituted with improper intent
and without probable cause,"1 46 and also includes abuse of process.
Washington requires the principal action to be "instituted with
knowledge that [it] was false, and unfounded, malicious and without
probable cause. 1 47 This statute also abolishes the special damage
ous."

142.
143.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.185 (Supp. 1986).
Wis. STAT. ANN, § 814.025 (West Supp. 1986).

144. Id. The constitutionality of § 814.025 was upheld in Estate of Bilsie v. Bilsie, 100
Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d 508 (1981). Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 299 N.W.2d 856
(1981) contains a good treatment of the requirement of a finding by the trial court and the
issues of notice and hearing. Robertson-Ryan & Assocs. v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 334
N.W.2d 246 (1983) treats the subject of frivolous defense. In Pohlhammer, the defendant
disappeared as the parties were going to another courtroom, and the trial judge refused a
continuance. Defendant's attorney did what he could, without defendant as a witness, by crossexamining plaintiff. The court found for the plaintiff and assessed attorney's fees against defendant and his counsel. The supreme court reversed the holding that the defense counsel was
liable.
Two good treatments of the Wisconsin statute are found in Sundby, Awarding Reasonable Attorney Fees Upon Frivolous Claims and Counterclaims Under § 814.025, Stats., 53
WIS. BAR BULL. 1 (May 1980); Comment, Is Wisconsin's Frivolous Claim Statute Frivolous? A Critical Analysis of Wis. Stat. § 814.025, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 279 (1985).
145. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. R. 11(a) (West Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. R. 11 (Michie Bobbs Merrill 1984); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. R. 2.114(D), (E) (1985);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. R. 11 (Anderson 1982); cf. OR. REV. STAT. R. 21(E) (1985) (motion to
strike).
146. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (1980).
147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.350 (Supp. 1987).
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rule in a suit against certain government officials. A number of
states, in their rules governing summary judgment, provide that if
the court finds that an affidavit filed in regard to the motion is
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall direct that the person filing the affidavit pay the other party
reasonable expenses incurred as a result, including reasonable attor148
ney's fees.
Frivolous appeals, especially when filed solely for delay, are
made the basis of action against the appellant in several states. The
appellate court may impose sanctions, including attorney's fees,
149
double costs, and damages that seem just.
Arizona provides that in "any contested action arising out of a
contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful
party reasonable attorney's fees.' 150 They are to be awarded "upon
clear and convincing evidence that the claim or defense constitutes
harassment, is groundless and not made in good faith."''
2. Adoption of the English Rule on Costs and Attorney's
Fees.-The state of Alaska follows the English rule on attorney's
fees, that they are to be included in the costs of an action and are
therefore awarded to the prevailing party. Apparently starting from
a 1900 Congressional Act for the Territory of Alaska, providing that
"there may be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment certain sums by way of indemnity for his attorney fees in maintaining
the action or defense thereto, which allowances are termed costs.' ' 5 2
The current statute directs the supreme court to "determine by rule
or order the costs, if any, that may be allowed a prevailing party in a
civil action."'' 53 Rule 54(d) now provides that "costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise di148. E.g., Conn. Super. Ct. Rules § 383 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. R. 1.510(g) (West
1985); Iowa Rules of Ct. Rule 237(g) (1986 rev. ed.); N.J. Civ. Pr. Rules, Rule 4:46-5(b)
(1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, Rule 1035(0 (Purdon 1986); Tex. Rules of Ct. Rule 166-A(g)
(West 1986). Many of the states add as an alternative sanction that the attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt. See also VT. R. CIV. PROC. Rule 3 (Supp. 1986) ("action ...

vexatiously commenced").
149.

E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2106 (1982); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 907

(West 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 211 § 10 (West Supp. 1986); Utah App. Proc.
Rules 33 (Michie Supp. 1986); cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-22-16 (1985) (double or treble costs for
action taken solely for delay).
150.
151.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (1982).
Id. § 12-341.01(C) (emphasis added).

152. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 509, 31 Stat. 321, 415.
153.

ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (Cum. Supp. 1986). See also McDonough v. Lee, 420

P.2d 459, 460-63 (Alaska 1966) (historical background on attorney's fees).
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rects," and Rule 82(a) contains a table stating the measure of attorney fees normally allowed.154 These provisions have withstood constitutional attack, 155 and the decisions indicate that "'[t]he purpose of
. the allowance of attorneys' fees is to partially compensate a prevailing party.' "511
* .

Some other states had adopted the English rule in special factual situations. For example, Florida (1980) provided for the award
of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party "in any medical
malpractice action."' 57 The constitutionality of the section was vigorously attacked but consistently upheld,'58 until it was repealed in
1986.151
Almost all of the states have special statutes providing for the
recovery of attorney's fees in certain types of situations. These are
passed for reasons of public policy, because the state wants to encourage the bringing of certain actions, because of the likelihood of
economic inequality of the parties, because the recovery is likely not
to be sufficient to make it feasible for an attorney to take the cases,
because the amount in issue is less than a designated amount, or for
other reasons.' 60 In any event, these statutes have not been passed in
an effort to solve the problem of frivolous litigation, and they are
therefore not fully relevant to the subject of this Article.
B.

Federal Decisions, Statutes, and Rules

1. Judicial Establishment of the Bad-Faith Rule.-The distinction between the English rule that the prevailing party may recover
his attorney's fees from the loser and the American rule that each
party pay his own attorney's fees has already been stated. The
United States Supreme Court has consistently been a strong adherent of the American rule. Its first decision concerning this matter
154.
155.
156.
Preferred

Alaska R. Civ. P. 54(d), 82(a).
See Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 36-37 (Alaska 1979).
See DeWitt v. Liberty Leasing Co., 499 P.2d 599, 602 (Alaska 1972) (quoting
Gen. Agency v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 1964)).
157. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West Supp. 1985).
158. See Davis v. North Shore Hosp., 452 So. 2d 937 (Fla. App. 1983); Young v. Altenhaus, 488 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. App. 1983); Karlin v. Denson, 447 So. 2d 897 (Fla. App.
1983); Pohlman v. Mathews, 440 So. 2d 681 (Fla. App. 1983); Florida Medical Center v. Von
Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. App. 1983).
159. For the statute replacing § 768.56, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.595 (West 1986).
160. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 20.080 (1985) ($4,000); WASH. REV.CODE ANN. § 4.84.250
(Supp. 1987). See generally C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 65 (1935); 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES §§ 12:54-12:101 (1973).
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was in 1796.161 Since then, the Court has frequently referred to the

American rule and supported it vigorously.
In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,1 62 for

example, Chief Justice Warren traced the historical development in
an oft-quoted paragraph. 163 The Court held to the American rule
and refused to construe the Lanham Act to permit a prevailing party

to recover attorney's fees from an intentional trademark infringer.
Two potential exceptions gradually came to be recognized and

established. The first derived from
the historic power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of
others in addition to himself, [and allowed him] to recover his
costs, including his attorneys' fees, from the fund or property itself
or directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit.'

The second exception allowed "a court [to] assess attorneys' fees for
the 'willful disobedience of a court order . . . as part of the fine to
be levied on the defendant, ' 6 . . . or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.' "16

Still a third exception had been developing in the lower federal
161. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
162. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
163. As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees
to successful plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have been
empowered to award counsel fees to defendants in all actions where such awards
might be made to plaintiffs. Rules governing administration of these and related
provisions have developed over the years. It is now customary in England, after
litigation of substantive claims has terminated, to conduct separate hearings before
special "taxing Masters" in order to determine the appropriateness and the size of
an award of counsel fees. To prevent the ancillary proceedings from becoming unduly protracted and burdensome, fees which may be included in an award are usually prescribed, even including the amounts that may be recovered for letters
drafted on behalf of a client.
Id.at 717 (footnotes omitted).
164. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) (footnotes omitted) (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) and other cases). For a
careful treatment of the inherent powers of the equity courts in this connection, see Guardian
Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds,
Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
165. 421 U.S. at 258 (quoting Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 718 (1967) and citing other cases).
166. 421 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)). The Alyeska opinion continues: "These exceptions are unquestionably assertions of
inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden
by Congress .... IId. at 259.
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courts, known as the "private attorney general" exception. It would
permit the court to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who obtained
a judicial decision, the benefits of which would inure to the public as
a whole or to a large portion of it. The problem was presented in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.1"' The suit by
the Wilderness Society was to obtain a declaratory injunction to the
effect that the planned Alaska pipeline was not in compliance with
statutory provisions. The court of appeals granted relief and awarded
attorney's fees. The Supreme Court declined to recognize this exception and held that the policy decisions involved were more appropriately made by Congress.
Obviously, the only one of these exceptions that directly concerns frivolous litigation is the second one. Just as obviously, the numerous congressional acts168 making special provision for attorney's
fees as a means of encouraging the suits have no direct concern with
means for controlling frivolous litigation. There is some interplay,
however, as demonstrated in two later Supreme Court cases. Both
involved suits under the Civil Rights Act. The first is Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,169
which involved a suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.170 The
EEOC had notified an employee of the garment company that she
had the right to sue the company for racial discrimination, and when
she failed to sue, the EEOC brought action two years later. The
company's motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground
that the discrimination charge had not been pending before the
Commission at the appropriate time. The company sought an award
of attorney's fees under section 706(k) of the Act, providing that the
court, "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party

. . .

a rea-

sonable attorney's fee."171 The refusal to grant the award was affirmed by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. Had the employee sued on her own and prevailed, she would have been entitled
to the award, the Court said, but the trial court acted within its
discretion in not awarding the fees to a defendant who had simply
prevailed; and it might have awarded fees "upon a finding that the
167. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
168. A long list of these statutes is cited in Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33. See also
Rader, The Fee Awards Act of 1976: Examining the Foundation for Legislative Reform of
Attorney's Fees Shifting, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 77 (1984).

169. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1982).
171.

Id.
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plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation,
172
even though not brought in subjective bad faith."
The second case, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,17 3 also involved the Civil Rights Act and racial discrimination. In this class
action, counsel for the plaintiff served interrogatories on the defendant, which answered and served interrogatories of its own. The plaintiff's counsel failed to answer or to respond to an order compelling
answers, or to appear for an argument or the taking of a deposition,
or to file a brief on an issue submitted by the trial court. The trial
court granted a motion to dismiss, and awarded court costs and attorney's fees to the defendant (exceeding $17,000). The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that
an attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case [as to
increase costs] unreasonably and vexatiously may be required. . . to
satisfy . . .such excess costs." The Supreme Court held that this

17 4
provision gave no authority to assess attorney's fees.
The Court agreed with the defendant, however, that the trial
court's ruling was a proper exercise of the court's inherent powers.
Declaring on the basis of Alyeska that the American rule on attorney's fees does not apply when the opposing party has acted in bad
faith, it added: "The bad-faith exception for the award of attorneys'
fees is not restricted to cases where the action is filed in bad faith.
'"[B]ad faith" may be found, not only in the actions that led to the
lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.' ,175
Alyeska and Roadway Express have clearly established the position that the federal courts have inherent power to impose sanctions on both a party and his attorney who files and pursues a frivolous action (one that is not at all "colorable") or who uses certain
procedural actions, including pleadings and motions, to accomplish
an improper ulterior purpose. The key expression is "bad faith." It is
to be compared with the words "malicious" and "abuse" in the common law tort actions. The decisions in the federal district and appeals courts rely on the pronouncements of these two cases.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1927.-The opinion in Roadway Express on

172. 434 U.S. at 421. The Court found that the legal issue settled by the summary
judgment was one of first impression, and the argument was therefore not frivolous.
173. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
174. Id. at 762-63.
175. Id. at 766 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)). There is an extensive
discussion of the case in Comment, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. REv. 950 (1980).
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June 23, 1980, would seem to indicate that section 1927 would
thereafter play no significant part in providing a remedy for frivolous
litigation. The section had been in effect since 1813 176 without substantial change and was referred to by the courts very seldom. Under
the American rule, an award of "costs" alone would not serve as an
effective sanction or provide needed compensation. But as an immediate reaction to the holding in Roadway Express, Congress
amended section 1927 so that, since September 12, 1980, it reads in
full:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in a
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may
be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, ex1 7
penses, and attorney'sfees reasonably incurred of such conduct.

This gave significant effect to the section, both for imposing a
sanction and for providing a compensatory remedy to the other
party. Observe that the imposition of the award is on the attorney
and not on a party to the suit, and that it is discretionary ("may"),
rather than mandatory. Observe also that its prime target is not the
filing of a meritless action but multiplying "proceedings

. .

.unrea-

sonably and vexatiously," 17 8 so that it appears to be laying down an
objective test. Influenced, however, by the language of the Supreme
Court in the cases on the inherent powers of the court, the courts
imported the language of "bad faith," and have made the test subjective. 79 This has meant that the two bases for imposing a sanction
176. 3 Stat. 21 (1813).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). The words in italics were added by the amendment. A
few cases, rendered prior to the amendment and prior to Railroad Express, were decided
under the belief that attorney's fees could be awarded. They may therefore be appropriately
referred to with the cases decided after the amendment.
178. "The mere fact that an action is without merit does not amount to bad faith."
Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980) (frivolous appeal)
(citing Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183-84 (1976)). Bad faith "'does not require that
the legal and factual bases for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obdurancy or malafides, the assertion of a colorable claim
will not bar the assessment of attorneys' fees against him.'" Lipsig v. National Student Marketing Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting In re National Student Marketing
Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726, 728 (D.D.C. 1978)).
179. "An action is brought in bad faith when the claim is entirely without color and has
been asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons";
"procedural bad faith or harassment" is sufficient. Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v.
Dasa Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977). Whether defense counsel increased the costs
"unreasonably and vexatiously" within the meaning of § 1927 depends on whether the language "unreasonably and vexatiously" is applied literally or whether it implies a bad faith or
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for some forms of frivolous litigation are largely construed as applying the same test. 180
Any part of the litigation process may be abused-that is, used
"unreasonably and vexatiously." The sanction may apply to the initial filing of a suit, 181 to its continuation after the lack of merit became evident,182 to the filing of a motion, 8 3 to the taking of an appeal, 8 " and to a combination of procedural devices. 1 85 The section
applies to the action of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
Appellate courts have been careful to insist on the granting of a
intentional misconduct requirement not explicit in the statute. The latter approach is suggested
by Asai v. Castillo, 593 F.2d 1222, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (bad faith requirement); United
States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 1976) (intent or recklessness); Kiefel v. Las Vegas
Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968) (a "serious and studied disregard for the
orderly processes of justice"); West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("a clear showing of bad faith"). See also Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d
1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982) ("We are persuaded by those decisions which require intent, recklessness or bad faith."); Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1984):
We believe that a rule permitting the imposition of attorneys' fees only where
the attorney intentionally acts without a plausible basis is proper. . . .In determining whether an attorney acted intentionally, a court need not rely solely on direct
evidence of the attorney's subjective knowledge. A court may infer intent from a
total lack of factual or legal basis for a suit. . . .A court may also look to extrinsic

or circumstantial evidence, such as research memoranda or letters to the client.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
180. See Gianna Enterprises v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), where the court stated: "Thus, the court's equitable and § 1927 powers are guided by
the similar if not identical standard." Id. at 1359 (citing and quoting from Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980)).
In a number of cases the claim has been founded on both bases, and the court does not
attempt to select a single basis for the decision. See, e.g., Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d
1339 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. Lipsig v. National Student Marketing Corp., 663 F.2d 178 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (no indication of any basis). On the other hand, in Overnite Transportation Co. v.
Chicago Industrial Tire Co., 697 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1983), the court tracked the language of §
1927 carefully, using the dictionary on "vexatious," and finding that the attorney's conduct
was not "multiplicious."
181. E.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 349 (2d Cir. 1980) (bad faith not found).
182. E.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 660 (2d Cir. 1983) (continuation of suit
found to be in bad faith).
183. E.g., North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 297 (S.D.
N.Y. 1979) (motion to disqualify opposing counsel).
184. E.g., Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1985).
185. In Pfister v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ga. 1980), and Kiefel v.
Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969),
the opinions go into considerable detail about the multifarious acts of a plaintiff's counsel and
a defendant's counsel, which the first court described as "the most outrageous and unprofessional conduct on the part of an attorney that this Court has ever encountered," 496 F.Supp.
at 932, and the second court described as "acts of misconduct ...correctly found to be
intentional, involving serious breaches of the Canon of Ethics," 404 F.2d at 1167. Sanctions
were imposed in both cases.
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hearing to give the attorney an opportunity to explain his reasons. 186
The sanction of attorney's fees does not apply to the total case unless
the whole suit should never have been brought,18 but
only to the ex7
pense involved in refuting the vexatious action.
3. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.-(a) The
OriginalRule.-In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted. They contained many provisions seeking to expedite the
trial of cases, to prevent abuses, and to insure a fair result. One
method for attaining these ends was to provide for sanctions in case
of violation of a rule. Several of the rules are pertinent to the subject
of frivolous litigation, but Rule 11 is particularly directed to alleviating that problem.
As originally promulgated, the Rule provided that every pleading must be signed by an attorney of record. This signature
constitutes a certificate . . . that he has read the pleading; that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose
of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action . ...18

For many years, the Rule was essentially ignored by judges and
lawyers alike.18 9 One of the difficulties was that the only specific
remedy referred to is the striking of a pleading as sham. This remedy was used in Freeman v. Kirby,190 an unusual and confusing case
in which the court found that the attorney had found a person willing to lend his name as a plaintiff, and, without knowledge of the
facts, to act the role of plaintiff in the expectation of being paid for
his time. The court concluded that an "attorney's certification under
such circumstances runs flagrantly afoul of the purpose of the
186. E.g., Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1394 (7th Cir. 1983).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) provides that the attorney may be required to "satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct" (emphasis added).
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
189. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "'Striking"Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976), provides a very thorough treatment of Rule I I up to the date of the Article. See id. at 34-37 for further indication
of the ineffectiveness of the Rule as shown by the cases.
190. 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See Risinger, supra note 189, at 39-42 for a discussion of the Freeman case, which was decided 23 years after promulgation of the Rule.
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rule."19
' Subsequent federal cases decided within the next few years
after Freeman did raise questions of groundless suits; these cases
usually talked about the tort actions of malicious civil prosecution
and abuse of process, and the inherent equitable power of the courts,
but made no reference to Rule 11.192

In 1973, a proper utilization of Rule 11 took place. In Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Association,193 a class
action was brought by mortgage borrowers against mortgage lenders
on the ground of conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws by agreeing
not to pay interest on escrow accounts to cover taxes due on the
mortgaged property, in order to eliminate this item as a basis for
competition. Not knowing which mortgage lenders were parties to
the conspiracy, plaintiff's lawyers utilized the device of suing every
institution listed in the Philadelphia phone book under "mortgages."
All lenders who responded that they were paying interest on the escrow account were voluntarily dismissed.
Motion was made by the defendants to strike the complaint as
being a sham and false on the basis of Rule 11. The court declined
to do this because the complaint had merit against the remaining
defendants. Under the authority for "appropriate disciplinary action," however, it found the action of the plaintiff's lawyers improper
and declared that they should be censured for adopting this method
of identifying those parties who might be subject to liability.194 Then
it held that it would notify the attorneys for the dismissed defendants "that they have a right to file with the Court a bill of costs for
the expenses incurred by their respective clients in having been
forced improperly to appear and to defend this suit. Those costs will
then be taxed to the attorneys for the plaintiffs."' 1 5 At last, there
was an appropriate interpretation of Rule 11.
This holding did not fully settle the issue of whether Rule 11
authorized the awarding of attorney's fees, however. In United
191. 27 F.R.D. at 399 (footnote omitted). In Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214, 216
(9th Cir. 1972), part of a complaint was stricken as false, but the plaintiff was given "at least

one opportunity to correct his defective complaint."
192.

Lawrence v. Fuld, 32 F.R.D. 329 (D. Md. 1963) (attorney's fees not included in

"costs"); Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966) (writ

of prohibition issued to trial court against allowing attorney's fees). In Smoot, the court held
that allowing attorney's fees would violate the right to a jury trial under the seventh

amendment.
193.

365 F.Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

194. Id. at 982.
195.

Id. at 983.
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States v. Standard Oil Co.,196 the Ninth Circuit held that "no statute authorizes the imposition of attorney's fees."' 97 The footnote to
this statement referred to Rule 11, quoting parts of it, and declared
that it "says nothing about disciplining a party by imposing attorney's fees upon him for any act of his lawyer, even if his lawyer
willfully violated Rule 11."'' After section 1927 was amended in
1980 to provide for awarding attorney's fees, however, the decisions
began to apply the same rule to Rule 11.
As the 1970's were expiring and the 1980's beginning, litigation
regarding Rule 11 became more frequent. And while reliance was
often placed not only on the Rule, but also on the inherent equitable
power of the courts and section 1927, and sometimes on other statutory provisions, the Rule usually played a significant role. An award
of attorney's fees became the usual sanction, and striking a pleading
as sham was not often sought or granted.
The major issue for the courts was whether the party filing the
pleading acted in bad faith. The courts recognized that the test to be
imposed was subjective. The "disciplinary action" was to be imposed
for a "wilful violation of [the] rule." The signature certified that the
attorney had read the pleading and that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay."' 199
In Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co.,2 00 a securities case, the district court granted a motion to strike and dismiss the complaint, and
defendant moved for attorney's fees. The court denied the petition,
saying that the party could rely on his attorney and that it was possible to reach the conclusion that the attorney acted in good faith.20 '
In McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 20 2 an employment case, the district court dismissed the action for failure to
exhaust internal union remedies and assessed fees of $1,000 against
the plaintiff's attorney, who admitted that he knew of the exhaustion
requirement but claimed that he had filed the suit at his client's insistence. He also misquoted a case by omitting a sentence that refuted his argument and did not respond to the defendant's allega196.

603 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979).

197. Id. at 103.
198. Id. at 103 n.2.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
200.
201.
202.

500 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. 11. 1980).
Id. at 176.
697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
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tions of bad faith until it became apparent that he might be
personally responsible for the fee.203 The appellate court affirmed the
award.
The four cases of Nemeroff v. Abelson20 4 all refer to Rule 11.
Nemeroff I explains that whether the question of awarding attorney's fees is considered under Rule 11, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1974, or the court's equitable power, "[tihe ultimate question...
is whether the plaintiff and/or counsel instituted the action 'in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.' ",20 Nemeroff
II declares that "Rule 11 speaks in plainly subjective terms," and
adds that the "standard under Rule 11, therefore, is bad faith ....
Assuming arguendo that an award of attorneys' fees is a permissible
sanction under Rule 11, our conclusion that the instant action was
not without foundation and hence not commenced in bad faith necessarily precludes the award of such fees under Rule 11."201 Nemeroff
III and IV simply held the bad faith test applicable without indicating a particular source. They also held that continuation of the action after further information had become available amounted to
conduct in bad faith, and awarded attorney's fees amounting to
$50,000 for one set of defendants and $26,000 for another. The case
207
was followed in Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trusts,
which quoted and relied on Rule 11.208
(b) The Amended Rule.-The amendments to Rule 11 had
been proposed sometime earlier, but they became effective on August 1, 1983. The time was clearly ripe. The original Rule had by
that time broken through the indifference of earlier years and was
being resorted to more frequently. Courts were showing themselves
more ready to award attorney's fees as a sanction, at times, perhaps,
because they had seen the proposed amendments. But as the advisory committee noted, the old Rule had "not been effective in deter203. Id. at 201-02.
204. Nemeroff 1, 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Nemeroff I, 620 F.2d 339 (2d
Cir. 1980); Nemeroff 111, 94 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Nemeroff IV, 704 F.2d 652 (2d
Cir. 1983).

205. 469 F. Supp. at 637 (quoting Browning Debenture Holders' Comm'n v. DASA
Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087 (2d Cir. 1977)). For a helpful and acute analysis of the treatment
in Nemeroff I of bad faith, see Note, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith, and Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1979).

206. 620 F.2d at 350 (citations omitted).
207. 97 F.R.D. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
208. For a comprehensive treatment of the federal law prior to the amendment of Rule
11, see Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Feesfor Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV.
613 (1983).
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ring abuses. '20 9
The major changes are numerous: 21 0 (1) the requirement of
signing a pleading now expressly applies to a "motion or other papers," as well as a pleading; (2) the certificate that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief "there is good ground to support
it and that it is not interposed for delay," is now changed to add
"formed after reasonable inquiry," and to certify that the pleading
or other paper "is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not imposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation"; and (3) if the Rule is violated, it
provides that the court "shall impose 211 . . . an appropriate sanction" on the attorney or the client, or both, which may include "reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing . . . . including a
'21 2
reasonable attorney's fee."

The new language thus requires a reasonable inquiry by the attorney. Instead of the broad and indefinite phrase "good ground," it
refers specifically to the two types of problems involved-adequate
proof to sustain the allegations ("well grounded in fact") and ade209. 97 F.R.D. at 198.
210. The text of Rule 1I, as amended, reads as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied
by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to
the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
211. The change from "may" to "shall" makes the directive mandatory.
212. Now that the most significant changes have been pointed out, it may be helpful to
look back to note 210 and read the entire Rule.
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quate basis in law ("warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-

ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law").
The advisory committee notes that this "standard is more stringent
than the original good faith formula and thus it is expected that a
greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation."21 3 The
committee also declares that the "rule is not intended to chill an

attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories. '"21

One difficulty with the original version lay in its use of the subjective test of "bad faith. ' 21 5 Bad faith is a standard leaving considerable discretion with the trial judge, but its subjective aspect normally leaves a sense of doubt in the judge's mind. As one judge put
it: "Given the nature of advocacy it would be well nigh impossible
even to establish that an advocate acted in 'subjective bad faith.' If
'
that were the criteria [sic] the Rule might as well be repealed." 216
The new version is confessedly more "stringent" than the old
one and purports to be objective. 217 A major basis for this position is
the requirement of making a "reasonable inquiry" before signing a
213. 97 F.R.D. at 198-99 (advisory committee's note).
214. Id. at 199. The committee adds that the "court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to
believe at the time the pleading, motion or other paper was submitted." Id. On this, see Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985).
215. This was also true of the cases based on the inherent equitable power of the courts,
and the cases under § 1927. In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852, 856 (C.D.
Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986), the court declared that it
was inappropriate to cite cases under the original Rule.
216. Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 106
F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). A footnote to the statement added, "Having been many years at
the Bar before being on the Bench, we know from our own experience that there is no position-no matter how absurd--of which an advocate cannot convince himself." Id. at 359 n.3.
217. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985):
[w]e cannot say for a certainty that Eastway or its counsel acted in subjective bad
faith in bringing or maintaining this lawsuit, or that its actual motive was to harass
the City. After its travails of the preceding decade, it might just as well have been
acting out of frustration or desperation. We can say, however, that its claim of an
antitrust violation by non-competitors, without any allegation of an antitrust injury,
was destined to fail. Moreover, a competent attorney, after reasonable inquiry,
would have had to reach the same conclusion.
Id. See also Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Mohammed v. Union
Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1985) ("Plaintiff's failure to conduct any
investigation whatsoever into these claims is apparent from the present record, and this failure
requires the court to impose sanctions under Rule 1I."). Other cases involving no inquiry
include Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.
Fla. 1984); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984);
Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
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pleading, motion, or other paper, and thus certifying that it meets
the three standards imposed by Rule 11. When it is clear that the
party filing the paper has not made a reasonable inquiry, the courts
have customarily seized upon this and have been quite ready to impose an appropriate sanction. Apparently, however, in all of the
cases where this has occurred, the pleading, motion, or other paper
failed to meet one of the three standards. It would appear that if all
three criteria have been met, the lack of a reasonable inquiry would
not be treated as controlling.
The requirement that the inquiry be reasonable obviously poses
an objective test. When is it reasonable? The advisory committee
offers a list of pertinent factors: "how much time for investigation
was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for
information as to the facts underlying the pleading. . . whether the
pleading . . . was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether

he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the
2 8
bar.,

The first of these factors (amount of time available for the inquiry) involves the thoroughness of the inquiry and a possible excuse
for an inadequate one. Obviously, with a limitation period about to
expire (and no fault of the attorney in creating the predicament), he
must act on the information immediately available to him in preparing the complaint. But the obligation to complete the inquiry remains, and what he does about it may determine whether his inquiry
is reasonable under the existing facts of his case.
The other factors listed by the advisory committee also involve
the scope of the inquiry, how thorough and how independent it must
be, but they also go directly to the three tests in the Rule itself, and
they may be more appropriately treated under those topics.
According to the Rule, the three items that the attorney certifies to by affixing his signature are that the pleading, motion, or
other paper: (1) is "well grounded in fact"; (2) is "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law"; and (3) is "not interposed for any improper purpose," such as harassment, delay, or unnecessary expense.
Reading this for the first time, one instinctively feels that it could be
more clearly and adequately expressed, but judges and writers have
218.

97 F.R.D. at 199 (advisory committee's note). There is a detailed treatment of the

reasonableness of an inquiry in Unioil, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 802 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.),
superseded, 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986); and see Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986).
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not succeeded in saying it much better, after what must have been a
frustrating experience of trying.
"Well grounded in fact" sounds literally as if the attorney is
expected to certify that his proof will sustain all of the stated facts.
This is obviously not what is intended, and the courts have never felt
that they were required to grant a motion for attorney's fees whenever there is a judgment on the merit 2

9

or a summary judgment for

party.22 0

the
Yet experienced judges and lawyers have a sufficiently
clear concept of the intended idea to act upon it, even though they
have difficulty in putting it into words. This is a reason why in the
fact cases the court usually talks about the existence or adequacy of
the inquiry.
Judge Schwarzer perhaps comes closest to stating the idea by
explaining that the "facts must consist of admissable evidence or at
least be calculated to lead to such evidence. They need not be undisputed or indisputable but they must be sufficiently substantial to
support a reasonable belief in the existence of a factual basis for the
paper. Suspicion, rumor, or surmise will not do."' 221 Judge Kaufman
makes the test more clearly objective by declaring that the test is
whether "after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not
form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact
"222

The second item that the attorney certifies to in signing the
pleading, motion, or other paper is that it "is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."' 223 This item is more clearly expressed than
the first one. The signature of the person filing the pleading, motion,
or other paper is certifying that both of these requirements are met.
The reference to modification of existing law is wise in allowing for
development of the law in accordance with the common-law wont.
The phrase "good faith argument" is somewhat unfortunate, with its
connotation of a subjective rather than objective standard. Perhaps a
more neutral word, like tenable, plausible, or colorable, would have
been better. Each has a precise dictionary meaning that is more
219. See, e.g., Robinson v. C. R. Laurence Co., 105 F.R.D. 567 (D. Colo. 1985); Leema
Enterprises, Inc., v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
220. Heimbaugh v. City of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
221. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 187 (1985) (footnotes omitted) (citing Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp.
166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983)).
222. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
223. Id.
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nearly what is needed. There have been numerous cases involving
imposition of sanction for violation of this requirement. 2
The third item that the signature certifies to is that the pleading, motion, or other paper "is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation." Violation of this requirement, like
that of each of the first two, is in itself a sufficient basis for the
imposition of a sanction. This item is expressed in the negative; it is
also subjective in nature. Although some courts have indicated that
they regard this requirement as objective, they seem to be concerned
with the circumstantial nature of the evidence resorted to in order to
reach a conclusion; this evidence concerns "improper purpose" or
motive and state of mind. 2 5 But most of the time the conclusion is
based entirely on the conduct of the individual. One question that
the Rule does not answer, and the cases do not appear to have considered, is whether the improper purpose should be the sole one, the
primary one, or merely a significant one.226
Although the requirement of lack of an improper purpose
clearly applies to the complaint and the defensive pleadings,227 the
courts have found the first two requirements more suitable for dealing with these pleadings. Instead, this requirement has been most
appropriate in dealing with motions. There, it is easier to judge by
valid inference from the act of filing the motion whether the movant
was acting from an improper purpose. An experienced judge can instinctively trust his intuitive deductions in deciding whether the real
purpose was harassment, delay, or increase in litigation costs. The
224. See, e.g., Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F.
Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (labor dispute), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Sunn v.
Dean, 597 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (action against jurors in earlier case); Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. II. 1984) (constitutional torts---"shotgun
approach," suing under each of the amendments), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
225. See Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE LJ. 645
(1917).
226. In the tort action for malicious civil prosecution, the Restatement says that the

improper motive must be a primary one.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 676 (1977).

227. See Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(plaintiff employee sued defendant employer for discrimination and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and defendant counterclaimed for breach of the same covenant
and demanded $4,000,000 in punitive damages; court granted a sanction of $14,692 against
the defendant); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("The only
reasonable conclusion is that Kendrick and his attorneys filed the amended complaint, and the
subsequent declarations, not to prevail in the action, which they knew they could not, but to
serve their vindictive purpose to damage the defendants' reputations and subject them to personal harassment.").
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cases show many types of conduct for which sanctions have been
imposed. They include motions to dismiss, 228 for removal to federal
court or for remand, 229 for change of venue,230 to disqualify the opposing counsel, 231 a motion to impose a sanction for moving for a
sanction, 232 and false charge of fraud against an opposing law
3
firm. 23
District Judge Schwarzer has strongly argued for what would
amount to a fourth requirement-the requirement of candor. To

quote him:
A court has the right to expect that counsel will state the controlling law fairly. . . . A lawyer must not misstate the law, fail to
disclose adverse authority not disclosed by his opponent of which
he knows or should know, or omit facts critical to the application of
the rule of law relied on. If the rule on which he relies is circumscribed or conditioned so as to preclude its application to the case,
he is obligated to disclose that fact. If he knows another rule such
as the statute of limitations, res judicata or collateral estoppel categorically bars his client's claim, he cannot fail to disclose it in the
2 34
hope that it will be overlooked.
He had earlier held to this effect in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp.

v. Burroughs Corp.,23 5 where he imposed the sanction of attorney's
fees on a law firm filing a motion for summary judgment. Though
the motion raised two appropriate questions of law, Judge Schwarzer
objected to the form of the argument in the motion. First, on the
issue of statute of limitations, the argument cited a Supreme Court

case, and relied upon it as if it had decided in favor of the firm's
228. E.g., National Survival Game, Inc. v. Skirmish, U.S.A., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Lucha, Inc. v. Goeglein, 575 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Mo. 1983). In Miller v.
Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. I11.1984), defendant filed a motion to dismiss
one count on the ground that the cited statute did not support the claim. There was obviously a
typographical error in citing the section number, but the text of the statute had been set out; a
sanction was imposed.
229. See McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ala.
1985) (frivolous motion to remove after jury impanelled in state court; attorney's fees granted
for preparing for that case and for motion to remand).
230. Home-Pack Transp., Inc. v. Donovan, 102 F.R.D. 163 (D. Md. 1984).
231. Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp 166 (D. Colo. 1983); Glover v. Libman,
578 F. Supp. 748, 769 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("motion for disqualification was brought solely for
tactical reasons, and not for any sensitivity to ethical concerns").
232. E.g., Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656 (M.D. N.C.
1985); Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., 630 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
233. Cf. Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985).
234. Schwarzer, supra note 221, at 193.
235. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

51

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:433

argument, when the case had merely raised the issue without deciding it. Second, on the issue of whether mere economic damage could
be recovered in a products liability action, the argument cited and
relied on an earlier Supreme Court case without referring to three
later state cases casting doubt on the applicability of the first case.
The law firm appealed, and the court of appeals reversed two
years later in an important decision which carefully and thoroughly
treated the matter.3 It held that the purpose of Rule 11 is "to reduce the burden on district courts by sanctioning and, hence deterring, attorneys who submit motions or pleadings which cannot reasonably be supported in law or in fact,"237 and not to enforce ethical
standards expressed elsewhere. "In short, the fact that the court concludes that one argument or sub-argument in support of an otherwise valid motion, pleading, or other paper is unmeritorious does not
warrant a finding that the motion or pleading is frivolous or that the
Rule has been violated. 23 8
Brief reference can be made to some problems that have arisen,
or are likely to arise, in the administration of Rule 11. For example,
to what extent can the attorney rely on his client in making his inquiry? The quick answer is that the reliance must be reasonable.23 9
That is the basis of the attorney's decision, and that is the basis of
the judge's decision in reviewing it. The problem is a practical one,
and some very helpful practical suggestions have been made by three
attorneys in a recent article.24
Suppose there is a conflict between the attorney and the client,
with the client insisting on continuing the case and the attorney very
dubious about it. The cases seem to say that if the court decides that
the complaint is frivolous, the attorney is not excused by the fact
that he was following the demands of his client. 41
236. Golden Eagle Distr. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
237. Id. at 1542.
238. Id. at 1541.
239.

See supra note 210 and text accompanying notes 210-18.

240. See Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think, and Investigate, 11
LITIGATION

13, 14 (1985). In Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the

client was held subject to sanction because of a fraudulent claim, but the court-appointed
attorney was found to have made reasonable inquiry and investigation, and, so, was not subject
to sanction.
241. In. Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1985),
the court stated:
An attorney is obligated to dissuade his client from pursuing specious claims, and
thereby avoid possible sanctions by the court, as well as unnecessary costs of litigat-

ing a worthless claim. Although reasonable attorneys may differ about whether a
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What about confidential communications between the attorney
and the client? Answers are equivocal. The advisory committee's
note declares that the "rule does not require a party or an attorney
to disclose privileged communications

. . .

in order to show that the

signing of the pleading, motion or other paper is substantially justified."242 But Judge Schwarzer describes situations in which this may
243
come about.
What about joining additional parties either in order to get discovery from them or to prevent the statute of limitations from running in their behalf, if sufficient evidence develops during the trial to
impose liability on them? These are very dubious practices. The first
is likely to be regarded as an improper purpose, and the second apparently comes within the scope of Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Association,244 decided under the old rule.
Suppose information developing during the trial or as a result of
discovery makes it apparent that the claim is not justified? The rule
ought to be that there is a duty to dismiss the suit voluntarily at that
point, but there is doubt whether this is required by Rule 11.145
May the sanction of payment of litigation expenses and attorney's fees be rendered in favor of someone other than a party to the
action? There are a few cases in which this has been done. In Westmoreland v. CBS Inc.,246 a witness called by the defendant for a
deposition appeared and was ready to testify, but declined to do so
on videotape. The defendant petitioned for an order to show cause
why he should not be held in civil contempt of court. This developed
into a satellite dispute, with the district court denying an award of
particular claim is deserving of litigation, the obligation[s] to counsel the client
against bringing meritless claims, and to conduct reasonable inquiry before institut-

ing suit, are clear and unambiguous in all cases.
242. 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983) (advisory committee's note).
243. Schwarzer, supra note 221, at 199.
244. 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The Kinee case is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 193-95.
245. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1986), which held that,
according to the advisory notes to Rule 11, the "signer's conduct is to be judged as of the time
the pleading or other paper is signed," so that there is no obligation to take action to withdraw
a complaint on the basis of later acquired information. Amendment of the Rule is recom-

mended. See Parness, Three Suggestionsfor Trial Judges Overseeing CertificationStandards,
Nat'l L.J., Mar. 3, 1986, at 28. Oliveri does suggest that an obligation might arise on the basis

of § 1927 but subjective bad faith is required for it to apply. 803 F.2d at 1273.
Cf. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule I1.-Some "Chilling" Problems in
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1331 (1986), and
authorities there set forth (taking the position that there is a continuing duty).
246. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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costs and attorney's fees to the witness, and the court of appeals
granting the award for attorney's fees but declining to award travel
expenses incurred in coming to testify. In Eash v. Riggins Trucking
Inc.,247 defendant's attorney declined to agree to a settlement until
after a jury had been fully impanelled. The court of appeals upheld
the power of the district court to require that defendant's attorney
pay the U.S. Government the cost of impanelling the jury for one
day,24 8 but remanded the case due to questions regarding due
2
process.
In addition to the sanctions, litigation expenses, and attorney's
fees, can the injured party also recover for consequential damages of
various sorts, such as interference with person or property or emotional distress? It seems clear that the answer is no. The sanctions
are within the proper function of the trial judge in the litigation itself, for the purpose of maintaining efficient and orderly procedure in
the litigation process, and it is regarded as appropriate to allocate
money charges to compensate a party to the trial who has been put
to unnecessary litigation expense. Consequential damages, however,
would come within the scope of the guaranties of jury trial in the
tort action for malicious civil prosecution.250
Procedural aspects leading to the imposition of sanctions are
treated in the advisory committee's note. Sanction proceedings may
be started by motion of either party or by the court sua sponte. Due
process requirements such as a hearing must be met. Timing is at
the discretion of the court.
Several cases have emphasized that if the "court finds that an
attorney has violated rule 11, it must impose sanctions, 251 but the
type of attorney's fees and the measure of attorney's fees is at the
247. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
248. Id. at 568.
249. In remanding Eash, the court noted that "like 'other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on
the record.'" 757 F.2d at 570 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767
(1979)).
250. An action can be maintained in federal court under state law for malicious civil
prosecution or abuse of process if there is diversity of citizenship and requisite jurisdictional

amount, but even this would have to be a separate suit. Cf. Steele v. Morris, 608 F. Supp. 274
(S.D. W.Va. 1985) (separate suit required only if state law so dictates, not as an inherent
universal rule).
251.

Unioil, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 802 F.2d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir.), superseded,

809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986). See Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir.
1986); Zaldiver v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
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discretion of the judge.2 52 They can, for example, be for the total

attorney's fees of the injured party or for the time involved in preparation to defend against a particular motion.2 53 The extent of experience of the attorney against whom the sanction is imposed may be
relevant.2 54 The Rule itself provides that the sanction may be imposed against the party to the action or his attorney, or both. 255

Two recent cases contain significant opinions amounting, in essence, to legal essays on the Rule and its interpretation. Anyone concerned with application of the Rule should regard these opinions as
"must-reads." The cases are Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles 256 and

Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York.257
In Zaldivar, Judge Wiggins of the Ninth Circuit laid down an
authoritative standard for review by the appellate court of the district court's sanction orders, 258 discussed the "kind of conduct or
neglect by counsel which may appropriately trigger sanctions under
the Rule," 259 considered briefly the "essential elements" of the "frivolousness clause" and the "improper purpose clause," 260 and dis252. Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
253. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F.Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (total fees).
254. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 983
(S.D. Ala. 1985) (experienced attorney-fees set at $100 per hour); Heimbaugh v. City of San
Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (fees limited to $50 because of attorney's inexperience and economic situation).
255. See Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanction
against party only; attorney "acted commendably, in a professional manner, and in good faith,
respecting both his obligation as a court-appointed counsel and the court's processes"); Weir v.
Lehman Newspapers, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574, 576 (D. Colo. 1985) (attorney alone); Kendrick v.
Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (joint and several liability of party and
attorney).
256. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
257. 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
258. 780 F.2d at 828:
Appellate review of orders imposing sanctions under Rule 11 may require a
number of separate inquiries. If the facts relied upon by the district court to establish a violation of the Rule are disputed on appeal, we review the factual determinations of the district court under a clearly erroneous standard. If the legal conclusion
of the district court that the facts constitute a violation of the Rule is disputed, we
review that legal conclusion de novo. Finally, if the appropriateness of the sanction
imposed is challenged, we review the sanction under an abuse of discretion standard.
259. Id. at 829-30.
260. Id. at 830-31. The court regards the first clause as applicable if the certified paper
"is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was
not filed in subjective bad faith," id. at 831, and indicates that decisions under "the rule for
the payment of fees to prevailing defendants in litigation under the civil rights acts," id., may
appropriately be followed in Rule 11 cases. The court raises the issue of the meaning of harassment under the "improper purpose" clause and declares that the term "focuses upon the
improper purpose of the signer, objectively tested, rather than the consequences of the signer's

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

55

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
[Vol. 14:433

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

cussed in detail the application of its stated interpretations to the
facts of the case, ruling that the conduct did not justify the imposition of sanctions.
In Eastway, Chief Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York received the case on remand from the Second Circuit,
after that court had decided that sanctions were warranted, 61 to
make "a determination of 1) the proper amount of attorney's fees to
be awarded to the municipal defendants, and 2) the person or persons who should pay those fees." 2 2 His twenty-two page opinion covers this subject thoroughly and very helpfully. It discusses allocation
of the sanction between the attorney and his client, and allocation
among several causes of action, not all of which were frivolous; calculation of the expenditures of the party seeking the sanctions; mitigating factors, including wilfulness of the violation, first offenders
and persons of good repute, ability to pay, need for compensation,
degree of frivolousness, desire not to discourage particular types of
litigation; and award of fees for time spent on the motion for fees
and for time spent on frivolous appeal.26 3 The opinion then applies
the stated law to the facts of the case. 6 Judge Weinstein also discusses related topics, such as the due process right to a hearing and
the right to introduce evidence.265 On the topic of subjective and objective standards, he calls attention to the fact that, although under
Rule 11 the attorney certifies "that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry," the
pleading is well grounded in fact and law, the Second Circuit had
stated the requirement of the Rule to be that "[s]anctions shall be
imposed [if], after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could
not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law. ' 261 Judge Weinstein further
states that Eastway I "holds attorneys strictly liable for mistakes'26in7
judgment that lead to the filing of papers later deemed frivolous.
act, subjectively viewed by the signer's opponent." Id. at 832. The court leaves open the "difficult" abstract question of "whether a pleading or other paper.

. .

well grounded in fact and in

law . . .,may ever be the subject of a sanction because it is signed and filed for an improper
purpose," but holds that this cannot happen because of the filing of a complaint complying
"with the 'well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law' clause" of the Rule. Id.
261.
262.

762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway 1).
637 F. Supp. at 563.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 569-76. Subtitles are helpful in locating particular topics.
Id. at 576-84.
Id. at 567-69.
Id. at 567 (emphasis in original).
Id. Note that this is not true strict liability, but is only applying an objective rea-
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On the other hand, he declares that "a pure strict and unmitigated
liability standard in determining the form of the sanctions in Rule
11 cases is inappropriate. . . . Since state of mind is not a factor in
determining whether the Rule has been violated, it must be introduced in the second stage of the proceeding, and given weight in

deciding on the severity of the sanctions.

' 268

One other comment de-

serves quotation: "Punishment should never exceed the amount required to achieve the result desired. A deterrent is therefore appropriate when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the
269
undesirable behavior."
In addition to Rule 11, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contain a number of other rules and provisions that have come to

play an important role in the attempt to establish effective controls
on frivolous litigation. They especially include Rule 37 on Refusal to
Make or Cooperate in Discovery, and Rule 68 on Offer of Judgment.
Their relevance to the general problem is clear, but it would unduly
extend the length of this Article to attempt to spell out the details
involved. Frivolous appeals are treated in Rule 38, and in Supreme
Court Rule 49.2. Under the All Writs Statute, the courts have au-

thority to issue an injunction against vexatious litigation. 7
(c) Evaluation of Rule 11.- Since its amendment in 1983,
Rule 11 has become increasingly effective. 27 1 As judges and lawyers
sonable attorney standard.
268. Id. at 572 (emphasis in original).
269. Id. at 565.
270. All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). The all-time record for vexatious litigation was apparently set by attorney David K. Shuffman in bankruptcy proceedings involving
the Hartford Textile Corporation. The court of appeals finally enjoined him from continuation
of the harassment. In re Hartford Textile Corp., 681 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206 (1983). The opinions in this case and In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d
299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982), give some idea of the enormity of his
efforts.
271. There are several booklets on Rule 11. They are S. KAssIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RULE II SANCTIONS (Federal Judicial Center 1985); Vairo, Analysis of August 1, 1983
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in A.L.I.-A.B.A., 1 CIVIL PRACTICE
AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

35 (3d ed. 1985); Sanctions: Rule 11 and

Other Powers, Section of Litigation, A.B.A. (1986). The last two contain extensive collections
and treatment of the cases. See also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 1331-1335 (Supp. 1986).
The most thorough law review treatment is Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying
Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325. See also Parness, Three Suggestions for Trial Judges Overseeing Certification Standards,Nat'l L.J., Mar. 3, 1986, pp. 2831; Schwarzer, supra note 221; Symposium, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure:How Go the Best Laid Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. (1985) (addresses by judges
and lawyers on the "use and impact of the amended version of Rule 11"). Other articles
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become more fully acquainted with it, the extent of its use has been
growing and apparently the practice of abuse of litigation procedures
has been decreasing. For the first year or so after the amendment,
there were a number of cases in which the courts relied not only on
the Rule, but also on the inherent equitable powers of the courts in
bad faith cases or section 1927.272 That practice is now dying out.
Rule 11, with its objective test, is so much more effective and so
much easier to apply with a real sense of assuredness, that the courts
no longer feel the need to buttress the holding under Rule 11 with a
discussion of bad faith.
Although there have been criticisms of the Rule 273 and although
the possibility exists that a judge may abuse his authority under the
Rule, the reception seems to be generally favorable. 27 " The favorable
impression may well continue to grow, although some modifications
may prove desirable. 27 5
IV.

How SHOULD THE LAW DEAL WITH FRIVOLOUS
LITIGATION?

This survey of the legal methods developed by the federal government and the various states for handling the problem of frivolous
litigation reveals that, although there are many different approaches,
no single one is fully adequate for the purpose. They are all incomplete and imperfect, needing substantial improvement to become
properly effective.
A careful and impartial study of the numerous ideas that have
been devised, together with an attempt to ascertain how well they
have worked in practice, should provide the.basis for a synthesis of
treating Rule I I as part of the general subject of frivolous litigation are cited infra note 275.
272. E.g. Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upman & Co., 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Chapman v. Smith Barney, Harris Upman & Co., 106 S. Ct. 147 (1985); In
re Intel Sec. Litigation, 596 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv.,
Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775
F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985) (award of fees not warranted under either § 1927 or Rule 11).
273. See Weiss, A Practitioner'sCommentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11,
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1985); Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITMATION [No. 2] 16

(1985); Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule Il-Is the Stop, Look and Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV. 751 (1985).
274. See Snyder, supra note 273.
275. Some very recent law review studies of Rule I I are much more thorough and detailed than this more general Article. They trace the gradual development of standards under
the rules and are able to offer a more precise critique of its performance. See Cavanagh,
Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 (1986); Nelken, supra note 211; Note, Plausible Pleading: Developing
Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss3/1

58

Wade: On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural
1986]

FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND TORT LIABILITY

the most useful approaches to the overall problem. Curiously, although discussions of the problem have been rife in recent years,
almost all of the treatments have been confined to a single type of
remedy, usually with little indication that the writer is even aware of
the existence of other types of remedies that may supplement or sub-

stitute for the remedy being discussed. 6 I find only four articles
that attempt to provide the more general comparison of the several
2 77
approaches-two student notes and two leading articles.

Before beginning to offer a preliminary synthesis, I should like
to refer briefly to an antecedent question that has only a tangential

relationship to the main issue. The question is whether we should
abandon the general American rule on attorney's fees (that each
party bears his own) and shift to the English rule (that the winner
receives his attorney's fees from the loser). There have been quite a
number of articles arguing for the adoption of the English rule.278
Only one state follows the English rule,2'9 and it has been the
276. 1 do not intend this in a critical sense. Many of the articles are particularly helpful,
and by concentrating on particular remedial approaches, the authors can present a much more
complete and concrete treatment than this Article can provide.
277. Johnson & Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them-What
Relief is Available?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 927 (1985); Partridge, Wilkinson & Krouse, A Complaint Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous Litigation, 31 LOYOLA L. REV. 221 (1985);
Note, Liability for Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1980);
Note, Groundless Litigation,supra note 12.
The Yale Note offers a very thorough analysis of the historical development of malicious
civil prosecution and strongly advocates the utilization of a compulsory counterclaim. The
Vanderbilt Note covers most of the topics treated in the present Article and recommends a
uniform statute, offering brief specific suggestions as to its provisions; it was published before
the amendments to Rule 11, however, and does not have the benefit of the developments since
1983.
Both leading articles rely heavily on the student pieces. The Loyola Article offers details
of a "new, broader cause of action for unfounded litigation." Partridge, Wilkinson & Krouse,
supra, at 254. The Alabama Article does not make recommendations for change in the law,
but, "[r]ather than attempting to devise a new system for dealing with these actions, the authors suggest that, if used properly, the present system adequately responds to spurious actions
without threatening free access to the courts." Johnson & Cassady, supra, at 831. Both set out
a good summary of the various state and federal remedies.
278. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49
IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963); Sands, Attorneys' Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63 A.B.A. J. 510
(1977); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L.
REV. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REv. 313
(1941); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV.
1216 (1967).
279. ALASKA STATS. § 09.60.010 (Cum. Supp. 1986). For a thorough discussion of the
Alaska experience, see Note, Award of Attorneys Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 129 (1974).
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subject of criticism there. The Supreme Court has been a staunch
protagonist of the American rule, and state courts and legislatures
have shown no inclination to repudiate it. There seems no reason to
anticipate a change of the general American doctrine of attorney's
fees.
Congress has, however, frequently provided that in certain designated types of suits the fees should be granted to a winning plaintiff, and some of the state legislatures have followed a similar
course.280 Fee-shifting for certain types of suits has provided extensive discussion, and the task of finding a consistent, organized basis
for determining the types of situations in which the fees should be
shifted is a fascinating one.281
This whole issue relates to the general problem of frivolous litigation in only a peripheral fashion, however, and reference to the
28 2
sources of further study seems adequate for present purposes. I
may add my view that adherence to the American position in general
is desirable, combined with carefully coordinated, rather than haphazard, selection of any fee-shifting for particular types of suits or
factual situations.
Granting of attorney's fees as a sanction for engaging in frivolous litigation is creating an exception to the American rule, but it is
done both to protect the court system itself and to compensate the
recipient of the award from the exact harm at which the wrongful
conduct was aimed. Shifting the litigation expenses from the victim
of the wrongful conduct to the wrongdoer is an apt compromise between the general American rule and the English rule.
The problem of frivolous litigation has been dealt with in this
country under two distinct categories of the law-tort law and procedural law. The approaches and solutions developed in each category
grew up independently and without any real cross-references from
one to the other. This has produced a number of differences but it
has also demonstrated some surprising similarities.
The most significant similarity is that the two legal systems ar280. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-251 to 52-252 (West Supp. 1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-6-11 (1985); N.Y. PARTNERSHP LAW § 115-c (McKinney Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4614 (West Supp.
1986); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.84.250 (West Supp. 1986).
281. The best Article on the subject is Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee ShiftIng: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651; see also Mause, Winner Takes All: A ReExamination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26 (1969).

282. See Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1984)
(including a bibliography on the subject at 347).
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rived at what is essentially the same general view of what should be
the most suitable basis for taking action. Although they use different
words, they both assume that there are two distinct bases for legal
action, and the first one can be divided into two parts. This first standard is that the wrongful conduct (bringing a suit, filing a motion,
etc.) must be not completely unfounded (groundless, without any
merit, frivolous). This standard applies both to the factual aspect
(existence and proof of facts to sustain the action) and to the legal
aspect (tenable basis for the action under existing or potential law
applying to the facts). The second standard is that the actor's conduct must not be motivated by improper reasons ("malice" in tort
law, "bad faith" in procedural law).
The second major similarity is that, while both of the basic
standards are very hard to define, the greatest amount of difficulty
has arisen in handling the element of improper motivation-the circumstances under which it is required and those under which it may
be sufficient in itself.
There are many differences between the approaches of the tort
system and the procedural system. Some of them can be pointed out
specifically:
(1) The most important difference lies in the identification of
the conflicting interests to be balanced. Tort law balances the interest of the injured party in being protected from unjustifiable suits or
motions against the general public interest in having the courts open
and available for use by an individual, in order to ascertain whether
he has a valid action, and to obtain relief if he has. Procedural law
seeks to protect the judicial system from becoming clogged and overloaded. Both approaches are subject to criticism as being incomplete.
All three interests need to be taken into consideration and given
their appropriate weight. This method of handling the problem is
likely to bring some changes. Instead of thinking solely in terms of
sanctions and punishment of the party engaged in frivolous litigation, the court should think also of the injury to the other party and
compensating him for it. Instead of thinking solely of the duty of the
attorney to his own client, the court should think also of his duty to
the judicial system and his profession.
(2) Another difference is that the procedural law concentrates
on litigation expenses, including attorney's fees and loss of time,
while tort law concentrates on the consequential damages of litigation, such as injury to person or property (including harm to reputation and emotional distress), with a substantial minority of the states
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affording no compensation at all for litigation expenses. Here the
states following the minority tort rule are clearly in the wrong, and a
comprehensive approach would let the two positions complement
each other.
(3) Procedural law provides its remedies in the original action,
while tort law requires the bringing of a second action, with a different jury having no knowledge of what transpired in the first trial. To
the extent that it is possible and feasible to provide the needed relief,
the method of the procedural law should be adopted.
(4) Procedural law (at least the federal procedural law) applies
to litigation abuses of various types-complaints, defensive pleadings, motions, briefs-while the tort law is often limited in application to the bringing of a purported cause of action. The tort of abuse
of process aids in this connection but is inadequate in its coverage.
(5) Both tort and procedure started with the idea that bad faith
("malice") should be required in all actions of this nature. It is apparent now that this was a mistake. Procedure is moving to correct
the misstep. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 are making it much
more effective. In the tort action, malice is still generally required in
all actions, even though it may be inferred from lack of probable
cause.
(6) Procedural law has proved far more adaptable than tort law.
Procedural law has developed in this regard with the judicial system
and is now much more compatible with the conditions of modern
trials. Tort law has been quite rigid in this regard and has not materially changed since the early days of the Republic. Early misinterpretations of English law distorted the tort action and the distortion
has been retained even after the error has been pointed out. This is
all the more amazing since the appellate judges have openly taken
over the responsibility of keeping most common law tort rules up to
date and in accord with modern conditions.
What is needed is a conscious effort to coordinate the procedural and tort law, so that the trial can be handled as simply as
possible without the interference of frivolous litigation abuses and
without inconsistent results in the original and second trials. One
suggestion urged for accomplishing this goal is to authorize a counterclaim in the original trial and to make it compulsory if the claim
is to be made at all. This has the effect of eliminating the second
trial and it would promote consistent results. But it has what appear
to me to be some serious drawbacks. A counterclaim filed at the beginning of a suit may distort the nature of the trial and confuse the
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jury. Moreover, it would not work regarding frivolous motions during
the midst of the trial; and it would take actual control of the trial
from the court by having the jury make the decisions. The whole
system of sanctions for the purpose of protecting the smooth working
of the judicial system would be disrupted. That sanction system, of
course, is the device used by the rules of court. An attempt to solve
the problem by treating the filing of a complaint differently from
other litigation abuses would create some problems of its own.
My view of the way to attain simplicity and consistency is to
make use of a rule of court similar to the current Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules. Under Rule 11, the trial judge has control of the proceedings and can exercise his authority to require either party or his
attorney to pay to the other party appropriate litigation expenses,
including attorney's fees. The amount of these expenses and fees varies, of course, depending on whether the violation of the Rule went
to the whole cause of action or to a particular motion that did not
require much preparation to refute.
In the great majority of cases, this would provide sufficient relief for the injured party and would thus leave no need for a subsequent suit. This would create a situation similar in some respects to
that presently existing in England, where the winner gets his attorney's fees. There are very few reported English cases in modern
times in which the winner has found it worthwhile to bring an action
for consequential damages.
Would it be possible to give the court authority to award damages for consequential injuries and thus dispose of all of the cases?
This seems doubtful. The inherent equitable power of the court, as
defined by the Supreme Court cases, is not likely to spread that far.
In addition, there are constitutional guaranties of trial by jury that
might be held to apply. But even here, the finding reached by the
court that the conduct of the party or his attorney was in violation of
a court rule like Rule 11 should be entitled to the protection of the
principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as the Restatement calls it.2 83 The fact that the first determination that the conduct violated the standard of the rule was made by a judge, and
would be made by the jury if it had originated in the second trial, is
held not to prevent the application of collateral estoppel.284 With this
issue settled, the only remaining one would be the measure of dam283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
284. Id. § 27, comment d.

OF JUDGMENTS

§§ 27-29 (1982).
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ages. This makes it likely that a settlement would be reached. Of
course, it is necessary that the test for frivolous litigation be essentially the same in the two cases.
Careful attention should be given to defining clearly the tests
for both factual and legal inadequacy of the complaint, and for improper motive. There should be more meaningful language than is
now being used. The first test, in both of its forms, should be clearly
objective and the second should be subjective (motive). Instead of
requiring both factual or legal inadequacy and improper motivation
for the conduct, either should be sufficient, whether the court is acting under a court rule or there is a separate tort action for consequential damages.
An intent to mislead the court, as deduced from circumstantial
evidence, should be grounds for imposing a sanction, and attorney's
fees should be awarded to the other party to the extent that he sustained expenses.
285
The attorney or party should be held to a reasonable inquiry,
and to an awareness of the information that the reasonable inquiry
would have disclosed. The duty of reasonable inquiry should expressly be made a continuing one, with an obligation to change the
statements in any existing litigation papers to make them include the
new information.
Special consideration should be given to a stonewalling defense
and how to treat it. Several states have statutes providing sanctions
286
for untrue statements that the maker should know to be false.
In case of an egregious violation or persistently contumacious
conduct, the court should be authorized to impose on the derelict
attorney or party the obligation to reimburse not only the other
party but also the government itself for its expenses not incorporated
in the normal assessed costs. 2 87 Free access to the courts should not
be guaranteed to a person abusing the privilege so flagrantly.
If the details of these suggestions and ideas are worked out, how
should they be put into effect? There are several methods that can
be used. The first is drafting and enacting a statute. The statutory
approach could coordinate the changes in tort law and procedural
law and make them fit together. Perhaps a model act or even a uniform act might be drafted and promulgated.
285.

What is a "reasonable" inquiry depends upon the varying circumstances that arise

in the case.
286.
287.

See, e.g., Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
See, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
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In a state where the highest court has adequate authority to
promulgate rules of court, changes in the procedural law can be adequately handled by the court.
There is always the possibility of persuading the court to modify
the common law of torts in order to bring it up to date and in accord
with modern ideals. Although the courts have shown themselves reluctant to do this in the area of frivolous litigation, there are instances in which the action has been taken.2"' The action of one
court in making the desirable modifications, with a strong opinion
setting forth the reasons, might well start a trend.
V.

CONCLUSION

The law relating to frivolous litigation needs intensive study in
its entirety, rather than in a piecemeal fashion. It presently has serious shortcomings and its several parts sadly lack coordination. But it
is certainly corrigible. And the time is fully ripe for taking the right
kind of action.

288. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4, 7 (Okla. 1977)
(Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's doctrine of inherent equitable
power of the court to award attorney's fees "when an opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason," although the state courts had apparently not previously adopted the doctrine as such). See also Cox v. Ubik, 424 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. App.
1981).
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